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CHAPTER 1 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Overview 
A juror's task is to integrate evidence presented at trial into a decision about the guilt 
or innocence of the defendant. The legal system assumes that, when making such a 
decision, the juror has no prior knowledge about the crime in question, or can set aside 
such knowledge after receiving judicial instruction. However, recent work by V. Smith 
( 1991 a, 1993) has questioned this assumption by demonstrating that jurors have a difficult 
time setting aside such prior knowledge. She likens the verdict decision making process to 
a categorization task where the juror compares the features of the defendant's behavior to 
mental representations of crime categories. Although the legal system assumes that these 
mental representations are generated when the judge instructs the jury, Smith has 
demonstrated that jurors enter the trial with preconceived notions (oftentimes generated 
through exposure to the popular culture and the media) about the typical crime. These 
preconceived notions can bias the verdicts that these jurors would reach. 
Other potential biases in juridical decisions involve preconceived notions about 
criminals in general, or stereotypes. Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) found that subjects 
used stereotypes of targets to infer reasons for their transgressions and then based their 
sanction decisions on the implications of these inferences. Stereotype-consistent 
transgressions yielded more severe sanctions than stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. In 
fact, Bodenhausen (1988) documented that subjects' recall for stereotype-consistent 
evidence was heightened when the stereotype was activated prior to the presentation of the 
evidence. 
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These works indicate that there are at least two potential biases in juror decision-
making: mental representations of crimes and stereotypes of criminals. In the present 
studies, I seek to assess the interactive effect of these two factors. But to understand this 
effect, consideration of how jurors integrate evidence presented at trial is necessary. 
Several models of juror decision making have been offered, but one model, the Story 
Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1992), has received much recent 
attention. According to this model, jurors make sense out of the evidence presented at trial 
by constructing the story that best explains, in the juror's mind, the way the evidence is 
related. Jurors then listen to judicial instruction on the law and generate lists of critical 
features comprising their mental representations of the various verdict categories. They 
compare these feature lists to the attributes in their stories and select the verdict that best 
matches the story they have constructed. 
Potential biases can enter into this process in a number of places. Bodenhausen and 
Lichtenstein ( 1987) suggest that a stereotype can serve as a central theme around which the 
juror organizes the evidence presented at trial, and, with complex tasks like determining 
guilt, the juror is more likely to use this stereotype when making judgments. So 
stereotypes can influence the story construction stage. Secondly, the model assumes that 
judicial instruction serves as the basis for generating lists of critical features. However, the 
work of V. Smith (1991 a, 1993) demonstrates how jurors bring into the courtroom 
preconceived notions about the typical crime. These two biases have been shown to affect 
verdict and sentence decisions. The present study seeks to assess the interactive effect of 
representations of crimes and stereotypes of criminals on verdict and sentence decisions. 
Introduction 
When selecting a verdict, jurors must integrate the information presented at trial 
with legally defined decision criteria. Some models of jury decision-making have focused 
on the probability of a jury reaching a particular verdict (see Stasser, Kerr, & Davis, 1989, 
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for a review of several such models), focusing primarily on the group decision. Other 
models focus primarily on the evidence-evaluation stage of the decision-making process 
(see Pennington & Hastie, 1981); and, hence, remain at the individual level. Many of these 
evidence-evaluation models involve some sort of mathematical combination of the 
evidence, resulting in some probability estimate of defendant guilt. Usually, this 
combinatorial process involves the weighting of each individual piece of evidence in terms 
of its incriminatory value. In their review of these mathematical approaches to juror 
decision-making, Pennington and Hastie ( 1981) identified four categories into which these 
mathematical models might be grouped: information integration models, Bayesian models, 
Poisson models, and sequential weighting models. 
Mathematical Models of Evidence Evaluation 
Information Integration Models 
Anderson's (1974, 1978) general integration model of cognition has been applied to 
juror decision-making in an effort to understand how the juror integrates the pieces of 
evidence into a verdict preference (e.g., Kaplan, 1977; Kaplan & Kemmerick, 1974; 
Ostrom, Werner, & Saks, 1978). According to these approaches, the primary task of the 
juror is to integrate the conflicting testimony presented at trial into a single verdict decision. 
Ostrom, Werner, and Saks (1978) express a formal equation for how the information gets 
combined into a subjective probability that the defendant is guilty: 
Their model involves a combinatorial process where jurors reach a verdict by weighting the 
probative value of each piece of evidence. In essence, the juror's final decision (R k) is a 
weighted average of an initial opinion about the guilt of the defendant (wQ~O) and the 
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probative value of each piece of evidence, where ~i- refers to the subjective probability of 
guilt conveyed by the ith piece of evidence (or set of information, Kaplan & Kemmerick, 
1974), and Wi- refers to the weight associated with that piece of evidence. Weight is 
defined by Ostrom, Lerner, and Saks as the "relevance, importance, or credibility" given to 
the evidence item, and .k_ indicates the number of items integrated. Thus, according to 
these models, jurors weight and integrate each piece of information (whether that 
information be in the form of individual pieces of evidence, as in the Ostrom et al. (1978) 
work, or sets of statements that are evidential versus nonevidential as in the Kaplan and 
Kemmerick (1974) work) into an overall subjective probability of the defendant's guilt. 
Pennington and Hastie ( 1981) point out a number of inadequacies with this 
approach. One of the criticisms is that very few investigators (in fact, only Ostrom et al., 
1978) have attempted to estimate the integration parameters. Pennington and Hastie further 
argue that these models do not provide a complete picture of the juror's decision task. The 
integration procedure consists of two steps: the weighting of each evaluated item and the 
combining of the weighted scale values. The weighting stage has been interpreted as the 
jurors determining the credibility and admissibility of each piece of evidence. The 
combining stage results in a single value representing the likelihood of guilt. These two 
steps circumvent many of the steps that Pennington and Hastie deem necessary for a 
complete model of juror evidence-evaluation. For example, no mention is made of a 
standard of proof, and no effort is made to understand how jurors construct the sequence 
of events. Finally, these integration models offer no decision alternatives, and thus appear 
rigid in that only a guilty/not guilty decision is reached, rather than a consideration of 
several possible verdict decisions which could be reached (e.g., a murder trial has 
potentially four decision alternatives for a juror to consider: first-degree mruder, second-
degree murder, voluntary manslaughter, and involuntary manslaughter). 
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Bayesian Models 
Bayesian models typically define how people should think in a given situation. 
These predictions then get compared to the actual behavior of the individual in an effort to 
determine where decision-making deviates from what is considered optimal (Slovic & 
Lichtenstein, 1971 ). The application of Bayesian models to juror decision-making 
represents how the individual juror should think when making verdict decisions. One such 
model (Marshall & Wise, 1975) expresses an estimation of guilt relative to innocence at the 
end of the trial as the multiplicative function of a pretrial guilt-to-innocence estimation (Go) 
and the diagnostic weight assigned to each piece of evidence CL): 
In other words, the probability of a defendant being found guilty after the trial (Rn ) can be 
represented as the ratio of the probability of guilt given all the evidence to the probability of 
not guilty given all the evidence: 
R = P(GWn) 
n P(NGWn) 
where En represents the total evidence presented at trial. Thus, a juror's thought processes 
can be modeled as a series of simple inferences during which opinions are revised 
according to the direct impact of each piece of evidence. 
Pennington and Hastie's ( 1981) criticisms of a Bayesian approach to juror decision-
making follow in the same vein of criticisms levied against Bayesian applications to other 
domains; the problem is that people usually do not produce accurate Bayesian assessments 
(Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1971). Thus, although these models would estimate the optimal 
juror decision-making processes, rarely do people follow this approach. Again, this type of 
approach ignores construction of a logical sequence of events. Selection and evaluation of 
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the evidence is done in a single step. However, since this approach provides for a 
comparison of the probability of guilt versus innocence given the evidence presented, the 
model contains standard of proof and reasonable doubt criteria. Thus a Bayesian approach 
represents an improvement over the information integration approach. 
Poisson Models 
In statistical theory, a Poisson distribution is a relative of the binomial distribution. 
A Poisson variable, X, can take on only integer values, based on a probability function 
involving~ (the mathematical constant) and m, a constant known as the intensity of the 
Poisson process (Hays, 1994, pp. 152-153). A large number of physical and biological 
processes can be modeled as Poisson processes. For instance, the process of degeneration 
of a radioactive element can be regarded as a Poisson process. 
Thomas and Hogue (1976) made an attempt to map juror decision-making onto a 
Poisson process by conceptualizing the juror's task as a two-step process. First, the juror 
considers the evidence both for and against the defendant and combines it into a final 
estimate of the weight of the case for or against the defendant. The second step involves the 
decision made by the juror. Each juror is theorized to divide the potential range of weight 
into two decision regions (guilty and not guilty). Within this range is the threshold or 
crossover point. If the weight of the evidence against the defendant reaches that threshold, 
the juror votes guilty. Furthermore, Thomas and Hogue are able to conceptualize the 
confidence with which any individual juror holds a particular verdict as the distance 
between the apparent weight and the threshold value. An apparent weight near the threshold 
will result in low confidence. 
Pennington and Hastie ( 1981) interpret Thomas and Hogue's goal as describing the 
interrelations between three aspects of the juror's decision process: perceived guilt of the 
defendant, decision criteria (or threshold value), and confidence in the decision. The first 
two of these aspects are considered in one form or another in the information integration 
and Bayesian approaches. However, this model does include one variable which the 
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previous models do not: attention is given to the confidence with which the individual juror 
makes his/her decision. 
Sequential Weighting Models 
This type of model has its roots in learning theory, but is actually more closely 
allied with integration models, of which it is the forerunner (Pennington & Hastie, 1981, 
1986). In this case, the juror's task is conceptualized as a series of opinion changes. In 
fact, the trial is treated as a sequential judgment task, where the juror is said to revise 
his/her position with each new piece of evidence. Anderson (1959) proposed a composition 
rule where the new opinion is said to be a linear function of the juror's previous position 
and the new information, appropriately weighted. Although these models are intended to 
represent the juror's decision-making process as it occurs in real time, Pennington and 
Hastie ( 1981) see these models as essentially equivalent to the weighted averaging models 
discussed under the heading of information integration models, and thus having the same 
criticisms as those, namely that no effort is made to understand how jurors construct the 
sequence of events and that there is no standard of proof offered by these models for 
determining guilt. 
The Story Model 
In sum, Pennington and Hastie's (1981) criticisms of the above models all center 
around common ideas. These models have been criticized for their representations of how 
jurors evaluate evidence and reach verdicts. Pennington and Hastie point out, for instance, 
that the information integration and Bayesian models all rely on a single verdict, for which 
the juror must decide the defendant is either guilty or not guilty. However, in a murder 
trial, as Pennington and Hastie ( 1986, 1988) point out, the juror is faced with not one, but 
up to five potential decision alternatives: first degree murder, second degree murder, 
voluntary manslaughter, involuntary manslaughter, and not guilty because the defendant 
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acted in self-defense. The judge instructs the jury that they can reach any of those verdicts. 
The judge also outlines what is necessary for them to reach each of the verdicts. 
Pennington and Hastie ( 1981) also criticize the above models in that they provide 
no foundation for how jurors represent all of the information presented at trial as a whole. 
While these models specify how jurors integrate the evidence presented at trial, and how 
that information can be used to predict actual verdicts, they fail to specify precisely how the 
jurors make sense out of the entirety of the evidence, and how that leads to a particular 
verdict preference. To accomplish these various goals, Pennington and Hastie (1981, 
1986, 1988, 1992) propose what they call the Story Model. 
According to the Story Model, jurors make sense out of the information presented 
at trial by constructing a story, which represents, in the juror's mind, the sequence of 
events that occurred during the commission of a crime. Each juror then evaluates the weight 
of each piece of evidence in relation to the story he/she created. Various verdict categories 
are then given to the jurors by the judge during judicial instruction. Each verdict category is 
legally defined as a set of necessary and sufficient features. The juror then compares 
his/her story with the various category features, with the verdict category whose features 
best match the juror's story being the verdict chosen. In other words, the juror's verdict 
choice is decided by how he/she represents the evidence, including, of course, how well 
he/she understands the criteria for the different verdicts. 
Research by Pennington and Hastie (1986, 1988, 1992) seems to support some of 
their claims. Relying primarily on post-trial interviews (real jurors not selected for trial 
were solicited to watch a video reenactment of an actual trial), Pennington and Hastie found 
that jurors' stories differed depending upon which verdict alternative was chosen. 
However, Pennington and Hastie ( 1986) failed to demonstrate that the representations of 
the evidence constructed by the jurors were correlated with how they represented the 
verdict categories. And as V. Smith (1991a, 1993) has demonstrated, jurors' 
representations of the various verdict categories can affect their conviction rates. 
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Categorical Representations of Crimes 
According to the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1992), 
jurors make sense out of the evidence presented at trial by constructing a coherent story. 
This story then is compared to the various verdict category features to find the best fit. 
Generally, the legally defined features of the various verdict categories are presented to the 
jury during the judge's instructions. It is assumed that, coming into the courtroom, jurors 
are blank slates, onto which the law can be etched (V. Smith, 199la). However, 
considerable research has demonstrated that jurors have a difficult time understanding 
judicial instruction (Elwork, Sales, & Alfini, 1977; V. Smith, 1991b). Attempts to 
improve jurors' understanding of the judge's instructions have at times shown promise 
(e.g., V. Smith, 1991a); other times, the attempt has been dubious (e.g., Heuer & Penrod, 
1989). Does this mean, then, that jurors enter the deliberation phase of a trial with little or 
no understanding of what defines the various crimes? V. Smith (1991a) found that jurors 
possess representations of certain crimes which are often inaccurate. To understand these 
representations, an understanding of the cognitive processes involved in category formation 
is necessary. 
Cognitive Categorization 
Eleanor Rosch (1978) outlined two basic principles underlying the formation of 
categories. First, categories serve to maximize the amount of information available to the 
perceiver while minimizing the necessary cognitive effort. In other words, categories 
provide a type of cognitive economy. To categorize something means to consider it as 
equivalent to other category members and distinct from category non-members. By making 
these distinctions, category formation serves another purpose: to provide world structure. 
Category members are perceived to possess a set of correlated attributes which distinguish 
them from non-members that do not possess these attributes. Categories allow one to 
perceive the world as combinations of attributes rather than an unstructured set of 
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characteristics. Rosch ( 1978) further states that these principles imply the necessity that 
categories be viewed as individually heterogeneous. One way to achieve this separation is 
by defining categories in terms of necessary and sufficient features. This approach has 
come to be known as the classical approach to categorization (Medin, 1989; Medin & 
Smith, 1984; Murphy & Medin, 1985; E. Smith & Medin, 1981). According to these 
authors, problems with this approach led to what has been called the probabilistic approach 
(Medin, 1989; Smith & Medin, 1981 ). 
The Classical Approach 
Smith and Medin (1981) give a detailed account of this approach. According to 
their account, the classical view has a number of assumptions, some of which are shared 
by most theories of category formation (i.e., "The representation of a concept is a summary 
description of an entire class, rather than a set of descriptions of various subsets or 
exemplars of that class." Smith and Medin, 1981, p. 23). However, the critical 
assumption of the classical approach is that category membership is determined by a set of 
individually necessary and jointly sufficient features. For a feature to be individually 
necessary, every instance of the category must possess it; for a set of features to be jointly 
sufficient, every stimulus having that set of features must be a member of the category. It 
is this assumption that leads to problems and criticisms of the classical approach. 
One criticism of the classical approach discussed by Smith and Medin ( 1981) is that 
this approach cannot account for disjunctive categories. By disjunctive categories, they 
mean that two instances can be members of a certain category, even though they do not 
share any common attributes. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976) 
had subjects generate lists of defining features of various concepts, such as furniture, plant, 
and animal. These concepts have been called superordinate concepts (Mervis & Rosch, 
1981; Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975). Subjects had a difficult time generating lists 
of defining features for these categories, and the lists tended to be short. Further, these 
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superordinate categories have been demonstrated to be disjunctive. That is, two instances 
of these categories may not share many features. Sofa and bookcase would both be 
considered instances of the category "furniture," but they do not possess many common 
features. Obviously, this disjunctive effect spells problems for the classical approach, 
which assumes that all instances of a category share the same set of necessary and 
sufficient features. 
The most important criticism levied against the classical approach as a means for 
explaining real world categorization is its inability to account for the effects of typicality. 
Collins and Quillian (1969) asked subjects to verify statements in the form of "An Sis a 
P," (as in "A robin is a bird") where S and P represent various subject-predicate relations. 
This allowed for comparisons of a subject to various predicates, in particular, cases where 
one predicate noun is a subset of another (for example, "A robin is a bird" and "A robin is 
an animal"). The main finding was that the statement involving the subset predicate (bird) 
was verified more quickly than the other predicate (animal). Rips, Shoben, and Smith 
(1973) generated a model of semantic distance which further specified this relationship. In 
their model, the reason a robin is verified as a bird more quickly than as an animal is that 
the point in this multidimensional semantic space representing robin is closer (in Euclidean 
distance) to the point representing bird than it is to the point representing animal. 
Rosch (1973) countered the widely held belief of the time that categories had little 
internal structure and strict boundaries. She wrote that the opposite was in fact the case: 
"categories are composed of a 'core meaning' which consists of the 'clearest 
cases' of the category, 'surrounded' by other category members of 
decreasing similarity to that core meaning." (Rosch, 1973, p. 112) 
Her work on people's categories of colors also provides some enlightenment on the effects 
of typicality. She surmised that certain colors are considered core colors or focal colors 
across all cultures or languages. When subjects, from different ethnic backgrounds, were 
asked to choose the best example of their language's basic color terms, they tended to 
select the same areas of the color space. Rosch's work involved testing a group of people 
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whose language did not have any words for the basic color types. She wanted to see if 
they would learn the presumed natural prototypes of color categories more easily. What 
she found was that these people not only learned the categories more rapidly, but also that it 
was easier for them to learn sets of color categories organized around the presumed natural 
prototype colors than to learn categories organized around other areas of the color space. 
This finding suggests that typicality effects involve more than simple semantic 
relationships between target and category. Although Rosch's subjects' languages had no 
words to label the colors presented, they were able to categorize these colors much more 
easily around the presumed core colors. The color categories are centered on the core 
colors, with other category members surrounding this core. The further away from the 
core, the less similar the target. The work of Collins and Quillian ( 1969) with their subject-
predicate relations, and to a certain extent Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973), suggests a 
semantic distance relationship between the target and category. Rosch is suggesting that 
this relationship goes beyond mere semantics. Although her subjects could not 
semantically represent the colors, they were still able to categorize them around known 
colors. 
In sum, the work of Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973) and Rosch (1973) 
demonstrated that items judged to be highly typical members of a concept can be 
categorized more quickly and efficiently than items judged to be less typical. Their research 
indicates that people can rate members of a concept with respect to how typical or 
representative each member is of a concept. The main dependent variable in these studies 
was categorization time. Highly typical instances are categorized more quickly. However, 
categorization time is just one type of typicality effect. Rosch ( 1973) also noted that typical 
members of categories are the ones first learned by children (see also Mervis, 1980). 
Mervis, Catlin, and Rosch ( 1976) found that typical members of a category are likely to be 
named first when subjects are asked to produce all members of a category. 
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These typicality effects are incompatible with the classical approach, which assumes 
that all members of a concept are equivalent in terms of their possessing the same set of 
defining features. This supposition implies that one instance of a category should be 
judged just as typical of the concept as any other instance. Obviously the work described 
above does not support this supposition. There are instances of categories which are 
judged to be "better" members of the category than others. Since the classical approach did 
an inadequate job of explaining the empirical findings, a better approach to the study of 
categories was necessary. This different approach, called the probabilistic approach 
(Medin, 1989; Murphy & Medin, 1985; Smith & Medin, 1981) is best summarized by the 
quote above, taken from Rosch (1973). According to this approach, categories are best 
summarized as prototypes to which instances are compared. 
The Probabilistic Approach 
According to the probabilistic approach (Smith & Medin, 1981 ), the representation 
of a concept cannot be restricted to a set of necessary and sufficient features. Rather, a 
category is represented by the "prototype," which is some sort of measure of the average 
category member. Rosch (1975) conceived of natural categories as "fuzzy sets" (see also 
McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978), where the categories are organized around a cluster of 
correlated attributes that are merely typical (yet not defining) of category membership. The 
prototype, then, is the central tendency of the instances' properties or patterns (Rosch, 
1973; Smith & Medin, 1981). This prototype approach has been used to study artificial 
categories (Hampton, 1981; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), natural categories (McCloskey & 
Glucksberg, 1978; Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), 
psychological situations (Cantor, Mischel, & Schwartz, 1982), ad hoc categories 
(Barsalou, 1983), and person perception (Smith & Zarate, 1990; Zarate & Smith, 1990). 
There are a variety of approaches which would fall into the probabilistic approach 
(Palmer, 1978; Reed, 1972; Rosch, 1973; Rosch & Mervis, 1975), but these views all 
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share the same process of determining category membership. Potential category members 
are compared to some representation of the prototype. These views differ in terms of how 
the prototype is defined (for a complete discussion, see Smith & Medin, 1981 ). In some 
cases, the prototype will be defined in terms of a feature or attribute list (see Rosch & 
Mervis, 1975). Sometimes, the prototype is defined in terms of dimensions instead of 
features (Palmer, 1978; Reed, 1972). 
The probabilistic approach came primarily out of the study of typicality (or 
prototypicality, Smith & Medin, 1981). In addition to the research discussed above, there 
have been a number of studies that have tried to specify the determinants of typicality (Gati 
& Tversky, 1984; Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978). 
Probably the most important of these works is the Rosch and Mervis' (197 5) work on 
family resemblance. Here, participants were asked to list features of various subsets of a 
superordinate concept (e.g., furniture), where the subsets (e.g., chair, desk, table, etc.) 
varied in typicality. Rosch and Mervis showed that the distribution of listed features could 
provide a basis of typicality. Those features listed most frequently across various members 
(or subsets) of a superordinate category were considered to be typical of category members 
as a whole. Rosch and Mervis coined the term "family resemblance" to refer to category 
members' possession of attributes considered common to the category. Rosch and Mervis 
found that these family resemblance measures were very highly correlated with typicality 
ratings of the subsets. In essence, an item is a typical subset or member of a concept if it 
contains features shared by many other members of that same concept. The most 
commonly shared features make up what can be called the prototypical member of the 
category. 
Another attempt to explain the typicality effects has also focused on the idea of 
similarity (Gati & Tversky, 1984; Tversky, 1977; Tversky & Gati, 1978). Tversky (1977) 
defines the similarity of an instance to a prototype (or instances to other instances) in terms 
of the weighted effects of common and distinctive features. Similarity relationships will 
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depend heavily on the weights given to individual properties. Medin (1989) provides an 
example of the effects of the weighting scheme. According to Tversky's (1977) model, a 
zebra and a barber pole would be rated as more similar than a zebra and a horse, if the 
property "striped" is given sufficient weight (Medin, 1989). However, similarity is 
determined by shared features. The more features two instances share, the greater their 
judged similarity will be. Thus similarity and typicality should be highly correlated. 
Medin (1989) makes a number of arguments against similarity, typicality, and 
prototypes, in general. One of these arguments is that there is no clear-cut understanding 
of what defines a feature. Most of the research on categorization has started with the 
premise that people can report of what features their mental representations of concepts 
consist. In fact, Medin (1989) cites evidence from Keil (1979, 1981) that examples like 
"robin" and "squirrel" share many features which do not appear on subjects' attribute lists. 
Murphy and Medin ( 1985) take this argument a step further, suggesting that if the 
constraints on what defines a feature are absent, then the properties shared by two disparate 
objects (they use a plum and a lawn mower) are infinite. It appears that, when asked, 
people list only a subset of features associated with a concept. Ultimately, questions of 
categorization should center on the principles which guided the selection that particular 
subset of features. 
Rosch and Mervis (1975) had subjects generate lists for a number of different 
categories. These attribute lists were then used to define the prototype of the concept. 
Further, the rated typicality of an instance of a category was directly related to the number 
of defining features that instance possesses. Medin (1989) argues that such attribute lists 
represent a biased subset of knowledge (whether accurate or inaccurate) about a concept 
that people already possess. These biases can affect what people rate as typical and atypical 
of a concept. Thus, Medin argues that the correlation between attribute lists and typicality 
judgments is partly the result of these biases. 
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A prototype is considered to represent the central tendency of a category; that is, it 
is the average category member against which other instances are compared. Highly typical 
instances of a category are defined in terms of how similar they are to some prototype. 
Family resemblance can also be defined in terms of within-category similarity. However, 
many researchers suggest that this emphasis on within-category similarity fails to consider 
one's perception of the diversity within that category (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; 
Kashima & Kashima, 1993). This is especially pertinent to person perception and 
perceptions of social categories (Smith & Zarate, 1990; Zarate & Smith, 1990) where 
perceivers are found to be especially sensitive to variability within social groups (Hamilton 
& Sherman, 1994). 
To account for these categorization processes, some researchers have proposed the 
use of exemplar-based models (Brooks, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 1978). According to 
these models, categorization is achieved not through comparison to some prototype, but 
rather by comparing the target to a set of retrieved exemplars (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; 
Smith & Medin, 1981 ). The exemplars retrieved are assumed to be those most similar to 
the target (Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1987, 1988; Smith & Zarate, 1990). A 
more thorough analysis of exemplar-based models will be considered when attention is 
shifted to person perception and stereotyping. 
Crime Categories 
V. Smith (199 la) documented the influences of people's preconceived notions 
about certain crimes on their subsequent verdict decisions. The criminal justice system 
assumes a classical approach to the classification of crimes. The law specifies a set of 
definable features which comprise the concept of the specific crime. Jurors are to compare 
the facts of the case with these definable features and make a determination of guilt. 
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However, there is evidence that jurors frequently do not make their verdict 
decisions in the way specified by the law. For example, the legal definition of burglary (as 
stated in the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 1981) reads: 
"To sustain the charge of Burglary, the State must prove the following 
propositions: 
1. The defendant knowingly entered a building; 
2. the defendant did so without authority; and 
3. the defendant did so with the intent to commit a felony." 
For an action to be classified as a burglary, it must possess all of the above properties. 
V. Smith (1991a, 1993) has found that people's representations of crimes do not 
necessarily follow the law. She had subjects list those attributes considered typical of 
various crimes (assault, burglary, kidnapping, murder, and robbery). Her lists yielded the 
features that subjects commonly associate with these crimes. The most frequently 
mentioned attribute for each crime, along with the percentage of her subjects who listed it, 
are listed below (see V. Smith, 1991a for the complete lists): 
Assault 
Burglary 
Kidnapping 
Murder 
Robbery 
Attribute 
Physical assault (90%) 
Something of value taken (54%) 
Ransom demand (63%) 
Perpetrator armed (77%) 
Something of value taken (75%) 
Using these feature lists, she was able to create crime scenarios which differed in terms of 
the number of features considered typical of the crime they contained. When she then 
asked her subjects to rate the typicality of the crime in question, her subjects rated those 
scenarios with the greater number of features as more typical of the crime category than 
those scenarios containing few characteristics. 
V. Smith (199la) then had subjects read a number of these typical and atypical 
scenarios and had subjects rate the guilt or innocence of the defendant for each. She 
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surmised that defendants who commit typical crimes would be judged guilty more than 
defendants who commit atypical crimes. Although all of Smith's crime scenarios met the 
legal definitions for the crimes in question, typicality affected the conviction rates. 
Although many of the features listed as typical for a crime were not legally necessary for 
determining guilt, subjects tended to judge the defendant in typical crimes as guilty more 
often than the defendant in atypical crimes (93% for typical crimes, 63% for atypical 
crimes). The range of guilty verdicts for atypical crimes was from 21 %(burglary) to 100% 
(murder). In fact, for the three crimes where there was a significant difference for 
typicality (assault, burglary, and kidnapping), the difference in conviction rates between 
typical and atypical crimes is even more pronounced (89% for typical crimes; 39% for 
atypical crimes). 
As was stated above, the law presumes a classical approach to the categorization of 
crimes. However, V. Smith's work (199la, 1993) demonstrates the possibility that jurors' 
representations of crimes may be more similar to the probabilistic approach. When 
reaching a verdict decision, Smith argues that jurors compare the features of the particular 
crime with these representations which she likens to prototypes of crime categories. 
Pennington and Hastie (1986, 1988) also suggest that jurors enter the court with cognitive 
representations of the law in general. They surmise that jurors use this prior knowledge in 
combination with the facts of the case and judicial instruction to construct a story. They 
then choose a verdict by comparing their story with the features of learned verdict 
categories. Thus, both Pennington and Hastie's (1986, 1988, 1992) work and V. Smith's 
( 1991 a, 1993) work suggest that jurors possess prototypes of crimes to which they 
compare the facts of the case. However, it remains unclear whether or not jurors compare 
the evidence to prototypes of the verdict categories, since it is conceivable to obtain the 
same results through the utilization of a matching-by-exemplar procedure. Whether jurors 
are comparing the target crime to a prototype of the crime category or to a list of retrieved 
exemplars would be of empirical interest in a subsequent study, but is not of central 
importance for this work. 
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In addition to representations of crimes, other aspects of criminal cases are known 
to affect juror decision-making. In particular, criminal stereotypes have also been shown to 
affect the decisions jurors make, particularly with regards to sentencing decisions. 
Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) found that people used a criminal stereotype to infer the 
reasons for his/her transgression, and then based their punishment decisions on the 
implications of those inferences, considering other relevant information only when a 
stereotyped-based explanation was not available. Their data also suggest that once a 
stereotyped-based impression of the crime and its cause(s) was formed, participants 
exhibited a confirmation bias, seeking information which confirmed their beliefs. Thus, 
there was differential recall of presented information, depending on whether its implications 
were consistent with, inconsistent with, or irrelevant to those of the stereotype. It appears 
that people also use information about the criminal above and beyond information about the 
crime when making juridical decisions. 
Stereotypes and Person Perception 
Over a decade ago, Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) summarized the main conceptual 
approaches to the study of stereotypes (see also, Hamilton, 1979; Hamilton & Sherman, 
1994). The first approach, the psychodynamic approach, involves the use of defense 
mechanisms, such as the projection or displacement of tensions onto convenient outgroups. 
Thus, this approach emphasizes the role of motivational forces and the benefits of using 
stereotypes (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994 ). The second approach, the sociocultural 
approach, considers the acquisition and maintenance of intergroup beliefs and attitudes. 
Prejudice is seen primarily as a learned social behavior. 
While neither of these approaches alone offers a satisfactory account of 
stereotyping, together they do an adequate job. However, recent years have seen the 
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cognitive approach dominating the study of stereotypes (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; 
Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). The cognitive approach views stereotypes as beliefs or 
cognitive structures that can guide information processing. Hamilton and Trollier ( 1986) 
define a stereotype as "a cognitive structure that contains the perceiver's knowledge, 
beliefs, and expectations about a human group." Hamilton and Sherman (1994) see 
stereotypes as abstract knowledge structures linking a social group to a set of traits or 
behavioral characteristics. Such a conceptualization of stereotypes derived primarily out the 
work on categorization discussed above (prototype and exemplar models of categorization). 
However, this approach received a tremendous boost with the work of Tajfel (1969, 1970; 
Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971 ), including the development 
of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; see also, Turner, 1987). 
The categorization of people into social groups has the same advantages discussed 
for the categorization of objects (see Rosch, 1973, 1978). Stereotyping services cognitive 
efficiency (Hamilton, 1979; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994 ). The perceiver's grouping of 
people into social categories serves to reduce the enormous complexity of the social world. 
Categorization also enables us to anticipate the behaviors of others. When asked to judge 
the variability of social groups, people judge groups to which they do not belong as more 
homogeneous (Linville et al., 1986, 1989; Wilder, 1984). This outgroup homogeneity 
effect (Messick & Mackie, 1989) has been found with different conceptualizations and 
measures of homogeneity (Linville et al., 1986, 1989) and has been demonstrated to affect 
the inferences about outgroup members (Linville & Jones, 1980; Wilder, 1978). 
However, this does not imply that people are completely insensitive to variability within 
out groups (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Hastie, 1987). In fact, this has 
been the major criticism of prototype-based models of person perception (Hamilton & 
Sherman, 1994). 
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Cognitive Representations of Groups 
Cognitive representations of groups are assumed to be multi-element structures 
which define categories in terms of between-groups differences and within-groups 
homogeneity (Messick & Mackie, 1989). What do these structures look like? Some 
approaches to this question view stereotypes as abstractions of the central attributes of the 
group (Brewer et al., 1981; Cantor & Mischel, 1977; 1979). These abstractions (or 
prototypes) are based upon learning and experience (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Other 
approaches recognize the role of exemplar information, with less attention (if any) afforded 
to prototypes (Brooks, 1978; Medin & Schaffer, 1978). Because of limitations to both of 
these approaches, some call for mixed models of categorization (Lingle et al., 1984; Smith 
& Zarate, 1988, 1990; Zarate & Smith, 1990). 
Prototype Models 
Prototype models of social stereotypes (e.g., Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Cantor & 
Mischel, 1977, 1979), like prototype models of object categories, involve the storage of 
knowledge about a group as central-tendency information. While the central tendency 
information for the categorization of objects centers around object features or dimensions, 
prototypes of social groups are based upon traits. Posner and Keele ( 1968) demonstrated 
that subjects can learn to classify sets of patterns which are distortions of a prototype (see 
also, Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977; Reed, 1972). Through experience (either direct or 
indirect) with members of various social groups, abstract summary representations of those 
groups are generated and stored for future use (Hayes-Roth & Hayes-Roth, 1977). 
Stereotypes, then, are conceptualized as abstract cognitive representations that summarize 
knowledge about groups in a generalized form (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). 
According to these prototype models, categories do not have defining features that 
determine group membership. Rather, categories are defined as "fuzzy sets" (Rosch, 1978; 
Rosch & Mervis, 1975; McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1977) whose members vary in terms of 
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their similarity to some central-tendency, or prototype, of the group. Applied to 
stereotypes, an individual person can be categorized into any of several possible groups. If 
the features of the individual are sufficiently similar to the group prototype, that individual 
will be categorized as a member of that group. But what features of people are considered? 
Some writers (Brewer, 1988; Fiske, & Neuberg, 1990; Zarate & Smith, 1990) suggest that 
categorization is automatic for certain primitive features, like skin color or gender. Brewer, 
Dull, and Lui ( 1981) noted that young persons' cognitive representations of the elderly are 
partly based upon physical features. However, the total prototype was based upon a 
combination of physical, personality, and behavioral characteristics. So, while certain 
salient cues can serve as a basis for categorization, prototypes of groups are not necessarily 
confined to tangible features. 
Cantor and Mischel ( 1977, 1979) considered the use of personality traits as 
conceptual prototypes. Cantor and Mischel ( 1977) presented their subjects with material 
describing four fictional characters who differed as to the prototype intended (extrovert vs. 
introvert). Subjects were then given a recognition memory test. They found that the 
appropriate trait concept (extrovert or introvert) was activated when subjects obtained 
consistent information about the character. This trait was demonstrated to function as an 
organizing prototype for processing further material. Their results suggest a prototype-
based memory for personality information. Cohen ( 1983) tested various models of how 
prototypicality affects the speed and confidence with which an inference is made. She 
found that perceivers make affirming inferences more quickly and confidently about highly 
associated attributes. They also rejected low-associated attributes more quickly. Finally, 
Rothbart and Lewis ( 1988) demonstrated that when subjects were presented with 
information about individual group members (in particular, fraternity members) who varied 
in prototypicality, the tendency to infer a target behavior (liberal vs. conservative voting 
behaviors) from the individual member to the group as a whole increased with the 
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prototypicality of the category member. Thus, prototypes serve as an organization scheme 
for making inferences about group membership. 
Srull and Wyer (1979, 1980, 1989) postulate that the likelihood that a behavior is 
encoded in terms of a particular trait category is a function of the relative accessibility of 
that category in memory. Further, the trait category used to encode a particular behavior is 
thought to affect subsequent judgments of the person along dimensions to which it is 
directly or indirectly related. Indeed, Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler (1986) demonstrated that 
activating black or white racial categories by priming facilitated the response time for 
judgments of stereotypically consistent traits. Srull and Wyer (1980) demonstrated that 
when subjects experience a delay between activation of the trait category and acquisition of 
stimulus information, their ratings of the target with respect to the trait were directly related 
to the number of times the category had been activated and indirectly related to the length of 
the delay. Thus the likelihood of using a prototype is dependent upon the accessibility of 
that prototype in memory. 
Concerning prototype models, Hamilton and Sherman (1994) note that stereotype 
activation permits the perceiver to infer a target's features via group membership. These 
prototype models are not without their limitations, though. Categorization is predicated 
upon maximizing between-group differences and within-group similarity (Turner, 1985; 
Turner & Oakes, 1989). Also, we tend to perceive the outgroup as more homogeneous 
than it truly is (Linville et al, 1986, 1988). However, individuals are not completely 
insensitive to variability in groups (Linville, Fischer, & Salovey, 1989; Park & Hastie, 
1987). Prototype models represent the central tendencies of the person's beliefs about the 
target group, but fail to represent one's perception of diversity within that group (Hamilton 
& Sherman, 1994). Therefore, it would seem that to judge group variability, perceivers 
would need to rely on the retrieval of specific category exemplars (Klein, Loftus, Trafton, 
& Fuhrman, 1992) 
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Exemplar Models 
According to the various exemplar-based models (e.g., Brooks, 1978; Medin & 
Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1987; Smith & Zarate, 1990), categorization is not achieved by 
comparing a target to some abstract summary representation (prototype). Rather, 
categorization is achieved by comparing the target to a set of retrieved exemplars to 
determine category membership. The exemplars retrieved are assumed to be those most 
similar to the target. Thus, exemplar models can account for both central tendency and 
variability information. 
Medin and Schaffer ( 1978) use a weighted, interactive function (g) for determining 
the similarity of a pair of stimuli or exemplars. This function represents the degree of 
difference between the exemplars and ranges from 0 (no similarity) to 1 (virtually no 
difference). The overall similarity between the target and the category is the product of each 
of the individual g values. To categorize a new stimulus, the similarity of the new stimulus 
to each exemplar is computed. The probability of classifying the new stimulus in a 
particular category is a function of its summed similarity to all known members of the 
category, divided by its summed similarity to all known exemplars (both members and 
nonmembers). Classification of a target into a category is considered likely when there is a 
high degree of similarity between the target and the retrieved exemplars. 
Linville, Fischer, and Salovey (1989) consider the variability aspect of exemplar 
models in terms of the frequency distributions of the characteristics of the category 
members, and these distributions play an important role in categorization, in particular, the 
distributions of ingroups and outgroups were considered. The results of their four 
experiments indicate that greater familiarity with a social group leads to greater perceived 
differentiation and variability regarding that group. Further, ingroup members formed 
more differentiated and variable distributions for such characteristics as age and nationality. 
Interestingly enough, no ingroup-outgroup differences emerged for gender. Their 
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experiments also indicate a developmental effect: students perceived greater differentiation 
and variability among classmates over the course of a semester. 
Hamilton and Sherman ( 1994) listed a number of limitations to exemplar-based 
models. One important problem with these models is that they require an underlying theory 
to make the category coherent. Medin ( 1989) recognized the shift towards organization of 
concepts around theories. Citing Murphy and Medin ( 1985), Medin ( 1989) suggests that 
the relationship between a concept and an instance is akin to the relationship between theory 
and data. To categorize a target as a category member does not solely rely on a matching of 
properties, but instead on whether or not the target has the correct explanatory relationship 
to the theory organizing the concept. Accordingly, this approach potentially answers a 
nagging question for category researchers: "Why do we have the categories we have?" We 
use categories as data for our theories about the world (Medin, 1989). Others have noted 
the need for underlying theories. Medin and Wattenmaker (1987) noted that exemplars 
must be joined together by some sort of category definition or theory. Furthermore, 
Kahneman and Miller (1988) suggest that category norms are derived by considering 
various exemplars of the category. In this case, the norm in question defines the 
underlying theory. 
Mixed Models 
Some researchers have proposed that instead of just comparing prototype to 
exemplar models, perhaps models which account for both types of information are needed 
(Klein, et al 1992; Linville et al., 1989; Malt, 1989; Medin, Altom, & Murphy, 1984; 
Park & Hastie, 1987). For example, Medin, Altom, and Murphy (1984) assumed that 
category prototypes are abstracted by subjects and stored along with the known category 
exemplars. A new exemplar can be classified either by the similarity-to-exemplars rule 
from the Medin and Schaffer ( 1978) model or by its similarity to category prototypes. Their 
model parameter specifies the overall probability of using an exemplar based process, 
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which ranges from 0 (pure prototype-based) to 1 (pure exemplar-based). This model can 
account for the findings of Smith and Zarate ( 1990) where subjects who received exposure 
to the group prototype were more likely to use that prototype when making category 
decisions. 
Klein et al. ( 1992) also proposed a mixed model which assumed that both exemplar 
and prototype information is stored in memory, both types of information play a role in trait 
judgments, and the relative importance of each type of information varies with the amount 
trait-exemplifying behavioral knowledge one has about the target person. Their model 
proposes that during the early stages of learning about a category, judgments are based on 
exemplar information, because too few exemplars have been encountered to generate a 
meaningful prototype. This approach was based on the work of several others who 
considered the role of both exemplars and prototype representations in category learning 
(e.g., Barsalou, 1987; Busemeyer, Dewey, & Medin, 1984; Malt, 1989; Ross, Perkins, & 
Tenpenny, 1990). The basic finding of all this is that as the number of encounters with 
instances of a category increases, an abstraction or summary representation of the category 
can be generated. Thus the importance of specific exemplars for category judgments 
decreases as experience increases. 
Stereotype Use 
Knowing the structure of stereotypes is not the primary issue here. Rather, the 
question centers on how people use these stereotypes about groups. Hamilton et al. ( 1990) 
surmise that stereotypes provide expectancies about groups; thus they guide information 
processing and are often perpetuated by confirmatory biases (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994; 
Kunda, 1990; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974)). The activation of stereotypes has been 
found to influence attention (Zadney & Gerard, 1974; Bodenhausen, 1988); interpretation 
(Darley & Gross, 1983; Sagar & Schofield, 1980); and retrieval of information about social 
groups (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Cohen, 1981; Hamilton & Rose, 1980). 
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Much of the research concerning the effects of stereotypes on the inference process 
has focused on the implications of racial stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Duncan, 1976; 
Sagar & Schofield, 1980). Taylor, Fiske, and their colleagues have done a number of 
studies of how racial and gender stereotypes influence information processing, particularly 
when a person's race or gender is made salient (Taylor, 1981a; Taylor & Fiske, 1978; 
Taylor, Fiske, Close, Anderson, & Ruderman, 1977; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 
1978; for a review, see Taylor, 1981b). Taylor et al. (1978) demonstrated that stereotypes 
influence processing and representation in memory of information about participants. In 
three studies, their subjects observed slide and tape portrayals of interacting small groups 
which varied in their racial (or gender) mixture. They found that subjects did encode 
person information about the discussants by race and gender, and that they perceived 
greater within-group homogeneity (i.e., blacks were perceived to be similar to each other 
and different from whites). Because race was used as a basis for encoding and retrieving 
information, white subjects were able to remember if a statement was made by a black or a 
white, but found it difficult to determine which black person made that statement. People 
made a large number of within group errors but relatively few between-groups errors. 
Taylor et al. (1977; see also Hamilton, 1979) report that solo members of a group (a black 
in an otherwise white group as opposed to a black in a group of two other blacks and three 
whites) are evaluated more extremely and are perceived as having been more prominent in 
the group discussion. These results were replicated varying gender. 
Although most of the research studying the influences of stereotypes on inferences 
about individuals has focused on racial or gender stereotypes, stereotypes about other 
social groups also warrant discussion. Of particular importance for this research is the 
criminal stereotype. Bodenhausen and Wyer ( 1985) documented that subjects use 
stereotypes of targets to infer the reasons for transgressions and then base their punishment 
decisions on the implications of these inferences. Previous studies have indicated that 
stereotype-consistent behavior is perceived as more stable (Deaux, 1976) and more likely to 
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be attributed to dispositional factors (Taylor & Jaggi, 1974) than stereotype-inconsistent 
behavior. Moreover, Carroll ( 1978) noted that the severity of the punishment was directly 
related to the dispositional attributions made by subjects. Thus, Bodenhausen and Wyer 
( 1985) predicted that stereotype-consistent transgressions would yield more severe 
sanctions than stereotype-inconsistent behaviors. 
In their first study, Bodenhausen and Wyer (1985) asked subjects to recommend 
the disciplinary action to be taken for an offense that was either stereotypic or 
nonstereotypic of the transgressor's ethnic group. Previous work had demonstrated that 
"lack of cooperation with management" was perceived as typical for American workers and 
"laziness" was perceived as typical of Arab workers, and these two pieces of information 
were crossed in various scenarios. The recommended punishment was more severe for 
stereotype-consistent transgressions. In their second study, criminal behaviors were 
considered, with similar results. Stereotype-consistent criminal behavior (a Hispanic 
committing assault or a WASP (their term) committing forgery) yielded stiffer prison 
sentences than stereotype-inconsistent behavior. Furthermore, the consistent behaviors 
were perceived as more stable, and the actors were perceived as more likely to repeat their 
offense. 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein ( 1987) had subjects read information about either a 
Hispanic or nondescript defendant in a criminal trial. These subjects were initially 
instructed to judge either the defendant's guilt or his aggressiveness. After considering the 
evidence, subjects made both guilt determinations and judgments of aggressiveness 
(regardless of the instructions given) and then were asked to recall as much information as 
possible. They found that subjects who were initially asked to make a guilt judgment 
(which they considered a complex task) judged the defendant to be relatively more guilty 
and aggressive and recalled more negative information about the defendant if he was 
Hispanic (stereotypically consistent) than nondescript. On the other hand, those subjects 
who were initially instructed to rate the aggressiveness of the defendant (a simple task) did 
29 
not perceive either the guilt or the aggressiveness of the two defendants to differ 
significantly. According to these authors, the stereotype served as a central theme around 
which the perceivers organized the evidence presented at trial, and when they were faced 
with a complex task, they were more likely to use this stereotype when making their 
judgments. 
Bodenhausen ( 1988) examined two information processing mechanisms which 
could account for these effects. The interpretation hypothesis assumes that stereotypes 
produce discrimination by affecting the meaning attached to other information that is 
available. In a juror decision-making context, this implies that the activation of a stereotype 
may lead jurors to interpret the evidence presented at trial differently than they would have 
had not the stereotype been activated. Also, this hypothesis implies that the order of the 
presentation of the evidence should affect the way that piece of evidence gets integrated. 
Stereotypically consistent evidence presented early should be perceived as confirming the 
stereotype and should affect the processing of information presented later. The selective 
processing hypothesis considers the consistency of the behavior performed to the 
stereotype activated. Evidence that corroborates stereotypic beliefs may receive more 
attention, whereas, inconsistent information may be ignored (although work by Belmore 
( 1987) suggests that behaviors which are inconsistent with stereotypes receive more 
attention). Thus, subjects should exhibit better recall for that consistent evidence. Both of 
these hypotheses predict that stereotypes bias the way in which jurors evaluate the evidence 
presented at trial. 
In two juror decision-making studies, Bodenhausen (1988) attempted to assess the 
validity of both of these hypotheses. Using a similar Hispanic vs. nondescript defendant 
manipulation (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987), Bodenhausen (1988) examined the 
effects of social stereotypes on mock jurors' judgments about and memory for a criminal 
case. By subtly manipulating the introduction of the stereotype, Bodenhausen 
demonstrated that stereotypes produced discrimination against the defendant, but only 
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when the stereotype was activated before the case evidence was considered. At face value, 
this would seem to support the interpretation hypothesis. However, subjects' ratings of the 
implications of each piece of evidence revealed no effects of presentation order. This is 
inconsistent with the interpretation hypothesis. This study, though, does provide 
compelling evidence for the selective-processing hypothesis, since subjects' recall for the 
consistent evidence was better when the stereotype was activated prior to the presentation 
of the evidence. 
The Present Study 
The present study attempts to ascertain influences of crime and criminal information 
upon subjects' verdict and sentence decisions. The Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 
1986, 1988, 1992) suggests that people make sense out of evidence presented at trial by 
constructing a coherent story. They then compare this story to the various legal 
requirements for guilt. The crime category that best fits the subject's constructed story will 
be the crime option chosen. The Bodenhausen work (Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen 
& Lichtenstein, 1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985) demonstrates how stereotypes can 
influence the evaluation of evidence and subsequent judicial decisions. It appears that the 
stereotype serves as a central theme around which the subjects construct a coherent 
representation of the evidence (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). Perhaps crime and 
criminal stereotypes serve as the unifying theme for the story construction process, 
influencing interpretation of the evidence presented at trial. 
Most people probably have very little direct experience with criminals in general (let 
alone specific types of criminals), so they are probably more likely to base their 
impressions on theories of criminals that have been generated through exposure to popular 
culture and the media. Perhaps the crime in question would serve as the theory around 
which they are basing their exemplar lists. When asked to consider a "burglar," jurors may 
ask themselves: "Why would a person commit this crime?" The answer to this question 
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could serve as a basis for the different features associated with specific types of criminals, 
with the characteristics listed being those which would facilitate the commission of the 
crime. 
However, if their representations of the crimes in question are faulty, as V. Smith 
(1991 a, 1993) suggests, the stereotype may be biased because the theory upon which it is 
based (the crime category) is faulty. The juror who believes that for a burglary to occur, 
something must be taken, may see the typical burglar as someone who is either greedy or 
desperate. The stereotype induces an expectation for the purported criminal behavior, 
making the story seem more plausible and coherent. It should then be possible to devise 
consistencies and inconsistencies between stereotype and crime, setting up the expectation 
for a certain behavior and either confirming or disconfirming that expectation (for example, 
having a stereotypical "burglar" commit a different crime). 
The Story Model also assumes that people learn the various features necessary for 
guilt through judicial instructions. V. Smith (199la, 1993) has found people's 
understandings of judicial instruction to be wanting. Thus, when these jurors are faced 
with the task of matching the features of their stories with the various crime categories, they 
rely on their biased representations of various crimes, which then affect their verdict 
decisions. Stories perceived as typical for a given crime category led to significantly more 
guilty verdicts than atypical stories, even though all scenarios represented instances of the 
crime. V. Smith's work, though, did not attempt to manipulate the stereotype of the 
criminal. If the stereotype of the criminal influences the interpretation of the evidence as 
Bodenhausen (1988) suggests, then such information may influence verdict decisions 
made. Also, Bodenhausen's work (Bodenhausen, 1988; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 
1987; Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1985) is concerned with stereotype-consistent and 
stereotype-inconsistent information, with no attention given to the perceived typicality of 
the crime. However, if the criminal stereotype is consistent with the crime, it might serve 
to increase ratings of crime typicality. Thus, an instance of a crime previously judged as 
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atypical may receive a higher typicality rating if committed by a person who possesses traits 
consistent with the stereotype for that type of criminal. The increase in typicality would 
serve to increase the probability of reaching a guilty verdict. Similarly, inconsistency 
between crime and criminal stereotype could decrease ratings of perceived typicality of the 
crime, resulting in fewer guilty verdicts than would otherwise be obtained. 
The present study crossed the stereotypicality of the criminal with the typicality of 
the crime. Subjects were given a number of scenarios which differed in terms of the 
perceived typicality of crime and criminal. However, it was necessary to determine exactly 
what was considered typical of various crimes and criminal types. Two studies were done 
to achieve this end. Study 1 was aimed at determining what subjects perceive as 
characteristic of different crimes or criminals. Using an attribute-listing procedure similar 
to that employed by Smith (1991a), subjects were given two minutes to list words, 
phrases, and characteristics associated with, or considered typical of, five different crimes: 
assault, burglary, capital crime (referred to as a crime where the prosecution is seeking the 
death penalty), manslaughter, and murder. Other subjects were asked to list words, 
phrases, or characteristics associated with the corresponding criminals. Thus, Study 1 
resulted in lists of attributes associated with various crime or criminal types. 
Rosch and Mervis ( 1975) demonstrated that those instances which consist of a large 
number of features are rated as more typical of the category than instances containing few 
features. Using the attribute lists generated in Study 1, descriptions of crimes and 
criminals were generated which differed in the number of characteristic features they 
contained. Study 2 involved having subjects rate the typicality of the crime descriptions or 
the criminal profiles. Those descriptions and profiles rated as either most typical or most 
atypical were selected and combined to yield the stimulus materials for the final experiment. 
Typicality of the crime was expected to affect subjects' ratings of certainty about the 
commission of the crime. Subjects were expected to be more certain about typical than 
atypical crimes, and thus be more likely to render a guilty verdict for typical over atypical 
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crimes. This would replicate the findings of V. Smith ( 1991 a). However, if what 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein ( 1987) suggest is correct, that stereotypes serve as a central 
theme for evaluating the evidence, then the presentation of stereotype-consistent 
information could affect ratings of certainty about the crime, and thus, the proportion of 
guilty verdicts. Since V. Smith (199la) found conviction rates for typical crimes upwards 
of 90%, finding a significant effect for criminal stereotypicality on conviction rates for 
typical crimes may prove difficult, since 100% would be the maximum level. Therefore, if 
there is an effect of criminal stereotypicality on certainty ratings and verdict choices, it 
would be manifest in ratings for atypical crimes. 
Subjects 
CHAPTER2 
STUDY 1 
Method 
One hundred and two undergraduates of Loyola University of Chicago served as 
participants in this study. All participants were recruited via sign-up folders placed outside 
the psychology department office and received course credit for participation. 
Materials and Procedures 
On arrival, participants were told that the experiment concerned people's 
perceptions of various types of crimes and criminals, and that they would be required to list 
the characteristics, features, or attributes they felt were common to, or characteristic of, 
different types of crimes or criminals. For each crime, they had two minutes to write down 
all of the attributes that they could think of. They were explicitly instructed to list the 
features that came to mind. These are the identical procedures used by V. Smith (1991a). 
Participants were then given a packet of materials. For 55 subjects this packet 
consisted of five pages each with a type of crime printed at the top. The five 
crime types listed were murder, manslaughter, assault, burglary, and capital crime 
(presented as "crime where the prosecution seeks the death penalty"). The order of 
presentation of each of these crimes varied for each participant using a random starting 
position with rotation procedure. The other 47 subjects received a similar five page packet, 
but with the corresponding criminal types printed at the top. However, instead of printing 
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"burglar" or "murderer", the heading read "a person who is on trial for. .. " each of the 
various crimes. This, potentially, circumvented any biases participants might have held 
against convicted criminals. Participants were then given two minutes to list as many 
attributes as they could think of for each crime (or criminal) type, working on each crime 
individually. Participants were then debriefed and excused. 
Results and Discussion 
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Before examining the results, it should be noted that, in some cases, the 
information provided by subjects was not usable. For example, some subjects, who were 
unfamiliar with the crime (or criminal) type considered, indicated such on their response 
sheets. Other subjects provided nonuseful information (such as describing a criminal as 
he/she would appear in court; i.e., wearing prison uniform, shackled etc.). Such cases 
were removed from the total sample, but only for the specific crime (or criminal) type in 
question. 
Crimes 
For each crime category, a master list of features was compiled and the number of 
subjects listing each feature was tallied. Each subject listed an average of six to seven 
features for each crime, including references to the victim of the crime, the location of the 
crime, and the perpetrator, as well as what would be considered characteristic features of 
the criminal behavior. When computing the frequency of occurrence for each feature 
across subjects and crimes, features were considered equivalent if they matched exactly or 
if they were synonymous. For example, many subjects listed that a burglary involves 
something being taken. Some subjects listed the feature "stealing;" others listed "theft." 
These two terms were considered equivalent. Features that were not synonymous were not 
considered equivalent. This procedure is identical to that used by V. Smith (199la). 
Table 1 presents those features listed by approximately 30% or more of the 
participants. An examination of Table 1 reveals that 74% of subjects feel that assault 
Table 1.-- Features Perceived as Typical of Assault and Burglary 
Crime Type 
Assault 
Burglary 
Feature - Percentage Listing 
Physical Attack - 74% 
Sexual Attack - 52% 
Injuries - 37% 
Taking of Something - 87% 
Break-in - 60% 
Valuables Taken - 35% 
Occurs in a Home - 29% 
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Notes: For Assault: Physical Attack was defined via the following features: abuse, attack, 
battery, fight, hit, mug, shooting, stabbing, violence. Sexual Attack was defined via the 
following features: molestation, rape, sexual assault, sexual harassment. Injuries were 
defined via the following features: blood, bruises, pain, suffering. For Burglary: Act of 
taking something was defined via the following terms: robbery, stealing, theft. Break-in 
was defined via the following features: breaking and entering, broken glass/windows, 
intrusion, trespass. Valuables taken was defined via the following features: gold, jewelry, 
money, stereo, TV, VCR. 
typically involves some sort of physical attack. This is also evident by the numbers of 
people who also listed sexual attack and injuries as features of an assault. Only one person 
approximately listed the correct (legal) definition for the crime assault (" ... That the 
defendant engaged in conduct which placed the victim in reasonable apprehension of 
receiving bodily harm." Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, 1981 ), with only three subjects 
listing the term "threats" as a characteristic feature of the crime of assault. 
Participants were similarly uncertain about the legal definition of burglary. As was 
mentioned earlier, the legal definition of burglary does not require that something be taken. 
However, as is shown in Table 1, 87% of participants listed the taking of something as a 
characteristic feature. Further, 60% of subjects listed "breaking in" as the method for 
gaining entrance to the building, although this is not legally necessary. Typically, subjects 
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felt that something of value had to be taken, as well. Many subjects felt that such break-ins 
occurred in family homes or apartments. This is interesting in that this is probably how the 
typical burglary is portrayed in the popular culture. In fact, 20% of subjects wrote that the 
burglar is dressed in black! 
There was considerable overlap in what people thought was typical of a capital 
crime, murder, and manslaughter, in part because these terms (particularly 
murder and manslaughter) are often perceived as synonymous. In fact, 45% of subjects 
used the term "murder" when asked to characterize manslaughter. Table 2 displays those 
Table 2.-- Features Typically Associated with Capital Crimes, Murder, and 
Manslau ht g er 
Capital 
Feature Crime Murder Manslaughter 
Death 87% 60% 75% 
Sex Crime 38 7 0 
Bodily Harm 24 55 40 
Weapons Used 13 53 33 
Premeditation 13 29 6 
Not Premeditated 0 24 33 
Evil Act 24 24 33 
.. Notes: Death was defmed via the followmg terms: death, hom1c1de, k1llmg, manslaughter 
(for murder and capital crime), murder (for manslaughter and capital crime), mass murder. 
Sex Crime was defined via the following terms: rape, sexual assault. Bodily Harm was 
defined via the following terms: abuse, blood, bruises, suffering, violence. Weapons 
Used was defined via the following terms: poison, shoot, stab, weapons. Premeditation 
was defined via the following terms: intentional, premeditated. Not Premeditated was 
defined via the following terms: accident, impulsive, unintentional unplanned, unwanted. 
Evil Act was defined via the following terms: barbaric, brutal, cold-blooded, cruel, evil, 
heinous, horrible, immoral, inhuman, malicious. 
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features which were listed by approximately 30% of the subjects for any one of the three 
crime categories considered (i.e., capital crime, murder, manslaughter). As shown in the 
table, the most frequently mentioned feature for all three crimes was that someone died. It 
appears that the crucial factor which differentiates murder from manslaughter in the 
subjects' minds is the intent of the criminal. Murder is perceived as a premeditated act and 
manslaughter is typically perceived as not premeditated. 
This difference is similar to the legal differences between these two crimes. 
According to the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, to convict a defendant of murder, the 
State must prove that the defendant's actions caused the death (or "great bodily harm") of 
the victim and that he/she knew that his/her actions would cause the death (or at least the 
probability) of the victim. To convict of manslaughter, the State must prove the same two 
propositions, but further that the defendant acted "under a sudden or intense passion 
resulting from serious provocation" or the defendant believed that circumstances existed 
which justified the killing of the victim and that the defendant's belief was unreasonable. 
Although in both cases, the act is perceived as intentional, for murder, the act is 
premeditated and for manslaughter, the act is not premeditated. Thus, these subjects seem 
to have an intuitive understanding of the differences between the two crimes. 
The Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions lists a number of aggravating circumstances 
which can make the defendant eligible for the death penalty, including among other things 
the murder of a police officer, the murder of multiple victims, murder for hire, or the brutal 
murder of a child. When subjects were asked to list features typical of capital crimes 
(crimes where the defendant is eligible for the death penalty), they tended to list various, 
similar aggravating circumstances. They were not overly concerned with the state of mind 
of the defendant. One circumstance that was listed quite frequently was the crime of rape. 
The commission of this crime does not meet the eligibility requirements for the death 
penalty. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court in Coker v. Georgia invalidated the use 
of the death penalty for rape cases (Gillers, 1980). However, a number of subjects here 
perceive the crime of rape heinous enough to allow the penalty of death. 
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For at least the crimes of assault and burglary, it is clear that what subjects perceive 
as typical of these crimes is not necessarily what the law requires. It is also clear that 
people do have some representations of the crimes in question. Jurors are not blank slates. 
However, these representations are faulty. Features which subjects think are typical of 
assault and burglary are not features in the legal definitions for these crimes. These results 
replicate the results of Smith ( 1991 a). For capital crimes, murder, and manslaughter, what 
subjects perceive as typical of these crimes seems to align with the legal requirements for 
these crimes. For these reasons, only the crimes of assault and burglary were used in the 
subsequent studies. Of course, subjects were not asked to attempt to define the legal 
requirements for these crimes. What they perceive as typical may not be what they 
understand as the legal requirements. Thus, in Study 2, a subset of subjects were asked to 
attempt to specify the legal criteria for guilt for the crimes of assault and burglary. 
Defendants 
For each defendant type, master lists similar to those generated for the crime types 
were generated and the number of subjects making such statements were tallied. Similar 
restrictions for synonymous and non-synonymous features were applied here and the 
results of these analyses appear in Table 3. A brief investigation of Table 3 reveals some 
interesting findings regarding people's stereotypes of certain defendants. First, crimes 
against persons (assault, murder, manslaughter) yield different stereotypes than crimes 
against property (burglary). The person who commits assault, for example, is perceived to 
be highly aggressive and malevolent, full of anger, and possibly mentally ill. These 
features also apply 
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Table 3.-- Features Typically Associated With Different Types of Criminals 
Feature Burglary Assault Murder Man- Death 
slaughter Penalty 
Mentally Ill 11% 30% 40% 43% 47% 
Anger 2 40 21 35 16 
Malevolence 13 47 55 33 37 
Aggressive- 9 57 34 35 35 
ness 
Callousness 23 19 43 37 35 
Desperation 60 11 13 4 9 
Deceptive 28 0 9 11 6 
Low 34 17 23 26 7 
Intelligence 
Notes: Mental Ill was defmed by the followmg features: crazy, demented, disturbed, 
insane, mentally ill, nuts, psychotic. Anger was defined by the following features: angry, 
enraged, furious, hot-headed, short-tempered, uncontrolled. Malevolence was defined by 
the following features: cruel, evil, hateful, immoral, inhuman, malevolent, mean, sadistic. 
Aggressiveness was defined by the following features: abusive, aggressive, bully, 
dangerous, hurtful, physical, rough, threatening, tough, violent. Callousness was defined 
by the following features: callous, cold, no remorse, uncaring, unfeeling. Desperation 
was defined by the following features: deprived, desperate, hungry, needs money, poor. 
Deceptive was defined by the following features: crafty, deceptive, devious, manipulative, 
scheming, shifty, sneaky, tricky. Low Intelligence was defined by the following features: 
idiotic, ignorant, stupid, uneducated, unintelligent. 
to those accused of murder, manslaughter, and capital crimes. However, the stereotype for 
the property criminal is quite different. The focus here was on the situation the criminal 
faced (desperation) and the qualities the criminal must possess 
in order to be successful in this endeavor. These qualities were not considered important 
for the other criminal types. 
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It appears that when subjects were asked to generate qualities for these types of 
defendants, they are possibly taking into account their ideas and preconceptions about the 
crime that was committed. In essence, it seems as if the subjects are asking themselves the 
question: "Why would this person perform such an act?" Their answers to these questions 
serve as the bases for their stereotypes. This could potentially explain the differences 
observed across the crime types. The four crimes against persons listed could be perceived 
as progressions of the same basic idea, from assault (the threat) to manslaughter (killing 
without premeditation) to murder (killing with premeditation) to a capital crime (an 
exceptionally heinous murder). This would explain some of the proportions listed. 
Consider the "Mental Illness" category. More people perceive the capital criminal as being 
mentally ill, perhaps explaining in their minds how this person could perform such acts. 
Next consider the "Anger" category. Subjects perceive assault and manslaughter to be 
uncontrolled, irrational acts. The criminal simply acts out on his/her anger without 
thinking; whereas murder and the capital crime are perceived (and defined) as more 
premeditated and controlled. Aggressiveness on the part of the criminal is believed to be 
especially prevalent among people accused of assault. However, a relative isolation from 
the feelings of the victim (callousness) is prevalent amongst those who kill someone else. 
These stereotypes, though, greatly differ from what is perceived as typical for the 
burglar. The burglar is not perceived as acting out of anger, or because of mental illness, 
or aggressiveness. Instead, it appears as if the subject asks him/herself: "Why would this 
person have to take another's property?" Subjects perceive the motivation to be 
desperation, not aggressiveness. However, since it has already been demonstrated that a 
burglary does not necessarily require that something be taken, this characteristic of a 
burglar might not be entirely accurate. Since the subjects believe that a burglary involves 
something being taken, they are trying to rationalize the motivations of the defendant. 
Thus it appears as if the beliefs about the crime are contributing to descriptions of the 
criminal. The same logic can be used to understand stereotypes about assaulters, 
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murderers, etc. The crime could be seen as a foundation upon which people are build their 
stereotype about the criminal. 
As was mentioned earlier, only the crimes of burglary and assault were studied 
further. There are many reasons for this decision. First, these two crimes represent the 
two different types of crimes: crimes against persons versus crimes against property. 
Secondly, these are two crimes that have legal definitions about which people generally are 
uncertain. V. Smith (1991a) found the greatest typicality effects on verdicts for these two 
crimes. Thus it should be possible to construct cases which fit the legal definition of the 
crime, yet which do not match the features provided by the subjects. Thirdly, the criminals 
associated with these crimes offer the greatest divergence across the personality categories 
listed in Table 2. Further, it would be redundant to write criminal profiles across the four 
crimes against persons listed here since the features are so similar. 
CHAPTER3 
STUDY2 
Overview 
The thought-listing procedure employed in Study 1 resulted in lists of attributes 
associated with different types of crimes and criminals. From these lists, crime scenarios 
and criminal profiles were generated. These descriptions differed in terms of the number of 
features considered typical of that crime. For Study 2, these descriptions were given to 
subjetcs who answered a number of questions about each. Of primary interest were ratings 
of typicality for each description. If Rosch and Mervis (1975) are correct, then those 
descriptions containing the greater number of features should be judged as more typical of 
the crime or criminal in question. The results of Study 2 determined which crime 
scenarios and criminal profiles were used for the final study which was to assess the 
interactive impact of crime typicality and criminal stereotypicality on juridical decisions. 
Method 
Subjects 
One hundred and forty-five undergraduates of Loyola University of Chicago 
participated in this study. All participants were recruited via sign-up folders placed outside 
the psychology department office and received course credit for their participation. 
43 
44 
Materials and Procedures 
On arrival, participants were told that the study concerned people's perceptions of 
various types of crimes and criminals. They were told, further, that they would read a 
number of descriptions of crimes or profiles of criminals and answer some questions about 
each description. 
Participants were then given a packet of descriptions. For approximately one-half 
the subjects, this packet consisted of either nine different assault scenarios (n = 41) or 
seven different burglary scenarios (n = 29). These scenarios differed in terms of the 
number and types of features they contained (features came from the lists generated in 
Study 1) and can be found in Appendix A Tables 4 and 5 show the combination of 
features for each of the assault and burglary scenarios, respectively. For the assaults 
scenarios, Case B possessed the most features considered typical of the crime of assault, 
and the remaining scenarios consisted of different combinations of these features. 
Similarly, Case A of the burglary scenarios consisted of the most features. Subjects read 
and responded to all assault or burglary scenaios. The order of presentation of the nine 
assault scenarios or seven burglary scenarios was varied using a random starting order with 
rotation procedure. Thus there were nine possible orders for the assault scenarios and 
seven possible orders for the burglary scenarios. This accounts for the discrepancy in the 
number of subjects receiving either set of scenarios. 
For each scenario, subjects were asked to answer four questions, all in the form of 
seven-point scales. The first question addressed the subjects' degree of certainty that the 
crime in question was actually committed, with the scale ranging from 1 (absolutely certain 
the crime was committed) to 7 (absolutely certain the crime was not committed). The 
second question concerned ratings of typicality for each scenario, with the scale ranging 
from 1 (highly typical) to 7 (highly atypical). The third question asked subjects to rate the 
likelihood that the person would be found guilty of the crime in question, with the scale 
ranging from 1 (extremely likely) to 7 (extremely unlikely). The final question asked 
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Table 4.-- Features Contained Within the Different Assault Scenarios 
Physical Sexual Weapons Occurs at Victim 
Attack Attack Injuries Used Night Afraid 
Case A x x x x x 
CaseB x x x x x x 
CaseC x x 
CaseD x x 
CaseE x x 
Case F x x 
CaseG x 
CaseH x x x 
Case I x x 
Note: The first three columns are those features hsted most frequently. The fmal three 
columns contain features which were also listed by subjects in Study 1, but not listed by 
enough subjects to reach the 30% criterion. 
subjects to rate the harshness (or severity) of the behavior described in the scenario, with 
the scale ranging from 1 (extremely harsh) to 7 (not at all harsh). After reading all 
scenarios, subjects were asked to rank order all scenarios from the most to the least typical 
of the crime in question. Subjects were also asked to rank order the scenarios in terms of 
the perceived harshness of the behaviors. 
The other 75 subjects were given a set of eight person profiles (see Appendix B for 
the eight profiles used in this study). These profiles differed in terms of the qualities or 
traits ascribed to the person. Two of the profiles described a person who possessed traits 
Table 5. -- Features Contained Within the Different Burglary Scenarios 
Item Breaking Valuables Occurs Occurs at Dressed 
Taken and Taken in a Night m 
Entering Home Black 
Case A x x x x x 
CaseB x x x x 
CaseC x 
CaseD x x x 
CaseE x 
CaseF x 
CaseG x 
Note: The first three columns are those features listed most frequently. The fmal three 
columns contain features which were also listed by subjects in Study 1, but not listed by 
enough subjects to reach the 30% criterion. 
listed in study 1 as typical of an assaulter (angry, malevolent, and aggressive); two of the 
profiles described a person who possessed traits listed as typical of a burglar (desperate, 
deceptive, and of low intelligence). The other four profiles described people who 
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possessed a variety of positive or negative traits. Prior to generating these profiles, a large 
list of personality traits (including those listed as typical of assaulters and burglars) was 
given to three coders who were asked to rate the desirability of possessing each trait. 
Based on these ratings, traits were selected that had equivalent desirability ratings as the 
traits seen as typical of assaulters and burglars (each of these traits were equally negative in 
terms of desirability). These traits were obsessiveness, possessiveness, arrogance, and 
obnoxiousness. Different combinations of these traits were contained in two other profiles 
presented to subjects, where one profile described a person who was obsessive and 
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possessive (in his relationships with women) and the other profile described a person who 
was possessive (in a materialistic fashion), arrogant, and obnoxious. The final two 
profiles described people who possessed positive, desirable traits, such as being a hard-
worker, intelligent, pleasant, and relaxed. Subjects read and responded to each of the eight 
profiles, answering questions concerning the likelihood that the person described would 
commit either the crime of assault or burglary (subjects were randomly assigned to either 
the assault or the burglary condiiton). The order of presentation of these profiles was 
varied using a random starting order with rotation procedure. Thus there were eight 
possible orders for these profiles. 
Subjects were asked to read each profile and make ratings about the likelihood that 
the person described would commit a particular crime. For approximately one-half of these 
subjects (n = 37), the crime in question was assault; for the other one-half (n = 38), the 
crime was burglary. For each profile, subjects were asked to answer a number of 
questions. Three of these questions took the form of seven-point scales. The first question 
asked subjects to rate the likelihood that the person described would commit the crime in 
question (either assault or burglary), with the scale ranging from 1 (extremely likely) to 7 
(extremely unlikely). Subjects were then asked to rate the degree to which they perceived 
the person described as typical of the average assaulter or burglar, with the scale ranging 
from 1 (highly typical) to 7 (highly atypical). The final question of this form asked 
subjects to rate their degree of certainty that this person would commit the crime in 
question, with the scale ranging from 1 (extremely certain he would commit the crime) to 7 
(extremely certain he would not commit the crime). After answering these questions, 
subjects were also asked to respond to a series of adjective pairs presented as semantic-
differential questions where bipolar adjective pairs were separated by a seven-point scale. 
The bipolar adjective pairs used were angry--calm, evil--virtuous, unintelligent--intelligent, 
deceptive--non-deceptive, aggressive--non-aggressive, and desperate--non-desperate. The 
negative half of each of these pairs were those traits listed in study 1 as typical of either 
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assaulters or burglars. After reading each profile and answering all questions, subjects 
were asked to rank order these profiles in terms of the perceived typicality. Finally, 
subjects were asked to list the legal criteria which must be met before a person would be 
found guilty of the crime they had been considering. These perceived legal (defining) 
criteria could then be compared to those features perceived as typical of the crime to assess 
the degree of overlap between the two sets of features. 
After all subjects had answered all questions provided, they were debriefed and 
excused. 
Assault 
Results and Discussion 
Crimes 
Since all subjects made ratings of certainty, typicality, likelihood of guilt, and 
harshness for all nine cases, these ratings were entered into a repeated measures analysis of 
variance, with case as the within-subjects factor. The order of presentation was entered as 
a between-subjects factor in these analyses. For the question regarding ratings of certainty 
that the crime was committed, the analysis revealed a significant effect of case type, 
F(8,64) = 53.67, 12 < .001. Similar within-subjects effects were found for ratings of 
typicality (F (8,64) = 20.02, 12 < .001), likelihood of guilt (F(8,64) = 46.39, 12 < .001), 
and harshness (F(8,64) = 28.76, 12 < .001). No significant effects involving the order of 
presentation were found for any of these dependent measures. The mean scores for each of 
these questions, along with average typicality rank and average harshness rank, are 
presented in Table 6. 
The purpose of this study was to choose a very typical and a very atypical assault 
case. Using a 0, 1 coding scheme, each scenario was coded for the presence versus 
absence of each of the most frequently listed features from study 1: physical attack 
(hitting), sexual attack, weapons, and injuries. Ratings of typicality were hierarchically 
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Table 6. -- Ratings for Assault Scenarios: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Likelihood Typicality Harshness 
Certainty Typicality of Guilt Harshness Rank Rank 
M = 1.59 2.90 2.80 1.51 4.34 4.24 
Case A s = 0.97 1.14 1.57 0.71 2.01 1.71 
n = 41 41 41 41 41 41 
1.34 1.95 1.66 1.20 3.56 2.05 
CaseB 0.96 1.14 1.28 0.46 2.77 1.82 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
3.61 4.22 4.15 2.24 6.49 6.24 
CaseC 1.79 1.44 1.57 0.94 1.83 1.80 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
3.00 3.51 4.15 2.39 5.46 5.61 
CaseD 1.52 1.25 1.80 1.20 2.03 1.81 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
4.85 4.07 5.49 3.54 5.63 7.37 
CaseE 1.65 1.78 1.49 1.19 2.76 1.81 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
1.51 2.27 2.63 1.83 3.90 4.05 
CaseF 0.78 1.05 1.61 1.07 2.31 2.34 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
4.49 4.20 5.41 3.29 5.85 7.46 
CaseG 1.63 1.68 1.53 1.38 2.82 2.07 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
1.71 2.05 2.63 1.76 3.59 4.29 
CaseH 1.10 1.02 1.53 0.89 1.88 1.95 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
1.63 3.63 2.37 1.54 6.20 3.63 
Case I 1.11 1.74 1.43 0.90 2.61 2.31 
41 41 41 41 41 41 
regressed onto these dummy coded variables. Sexual attack (beta= .294) and presence of 
injuries (beta = .335) entered into the equation, accounting for 23 .21 % of the variance (P. < 
.0001 ). Furthermore, of those subjects who read person profiles and were asked to list the 
legal criteria for a conviction for assault, 79% (23 of 29 who responded) reported that 
hitting or striking something was legally necessary for guilt, by far the most frequently 
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mentioned criterion. The next most frequently mentioned criterion was intention on the 
part of the actor, listed by 24% (7 of 29) of respondents. When physical attack was forced 
into the equation predicting typicality scores, it only added .3% to the variance accounted 
for. Furthermore, the beta weights for sexual attack and presence of injuries were greatly 
reduced (.269 and .100, respectively) indicating a large degree of shared variance between 
these two variables and the physical attack variable (the beta weight for which was .150, 
12=.051). 
These findings suggest that the typical assault involves a sexual attack, where 
injuries are delivered to the victim; the atypical assault would not involve any 
kind of attack or injury. Investigation of the mean typicality scores in Table 6 
shows that the scenario labeled Case B was rated as most typical (since the scale value of 1 
corresponded with highly typical and 7 corresponded with highly atypical) and Case C was 
rated as least typical. Case B involves a man pulling a female jogger off the jogging path 
and sexually assaulting her with a knife; Case C involves a man threatening his landlord 
with a gun when the landlord tries to evict him. Dependent-groups! tests performed on the 
mean scores for the certainty question revealed that subjects were much more certain that a 
crime was committed in Case B than Case C, ! ( 40) = -7 .22, 12 < .001. Subjects also found 
Case B to be more typical of the average assault,! (40) = -8.06; 12 < .001 than Case C; and 
that the criminal in B was more likely to be found guilty of assault,! (40) = -9.04, 
12 < .001. These two scenarios also significantly differed in terms of the perceived 
harshness of the behavior with B being perceived as significantly more harsh, 
! ( 40) = -6.56, 12 < .001. 
Burglary 
Again, since all subjects made ratings of certainty, typicality, likelihood of guilt, 
and harshness for all seven scenarios, these ratings were entered into a 7 (order of 
presenteation - between subjects) x 7 (scenario - within subjects) repeated measures 
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analysis of variance. For the question regarding ratings of certainty that the crime was 
committed, the analysis revealed a significant case effect for these ratings, F(6,36) = 
67.42, 12 < .001. Similar case effects were found for ratings of typicality (F (6,36) = 
62.59, 12 < .001), likelihood of guilt (F(6,36) = 68.59, 12 < .001), and harshness (F(6,36) 
= 26.47, 12 < .001). No significant effects involving the order of presentation were found 
for any of these dependent measures. The mean scores for each of these questions, along 
with average typicality rank and average harshness rank, are presented in Table 7. 
Again, since the purpose here was to choose a very typical and very atypical 
burglary scenario, a 0, 1 coding scheme was used and each scenario was coded for 
the presence versus absence of each of the most frequently listed features of burglaries 
generated in study 1: the crime occurs in a home, something is taken, breaking and 
entering, and valuables are taken. Ratings of typicality were hierarchically regressed onto 
these dummy coded variables. The variable "something is taken" was the only variable that 
entered into the equation (beta= .755), accounting for 56.84% of the variance in typicality 
scores (12 < .0001). Furthermore, of those subjects who read person profiles and were 
asked to list the legal criteria for a conviction for burglary, 91 % (30 of 33 who responded) 
reported that taking something without the consent of the other person was legally 
necessary for guilt, by far the most frequently mentioned criterion. The next most 
frequently mentioned criterion was that access is usually achieved by breaking in, listed by 
27% (9 of 33) of respondents. When breaking and entering was forced into the equation 
predicting typicality scores, along with the "home" variable and the "valuables" variable, 
the effect of the "breaking and entering" was virtually zero (beta= -.002, 12 = .97), and the 
total model accounted for 57 .9% of the variance. 
These findings seem paradoxical. While over one-fourth of subjects listed breaking 
and entering as a necessary legal criterion for guilt, the impact of that factor on typicality 
ratings was virtually zero when other information was also present. It would seem that the 
typical burglary involves a person gaining access to a home and taking valuables. 
Furthermore, since over one-fourth of the subjects believed that breaking in was a legal 
criterion for guilt, that factor need also be considered as typical of the average burglary. 
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Investigation of the mean typicality scores in Table 7 shows that the scenario labeled Case 
Table 7. -- Ratings for burglary scenarios: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), 
and Sample Sizes (n) 
Likelihood Typicality Harshness 
Certainty Typicality Of Guilt Harshness Rank Rank 
M = 1.14 1.38 1.31 2.76 1.03 4.28 
Case A s = 0.74 0.86 0.71 1.53 0.19 1.79 
n = 29 29 29 29 29 29 
1.14 2.07 1.72 3.24 2.28 4.93 
CaseB 0.35 1.22 1.03 1.66 0.88 1.44 
29 29 29 29 29 29 
5.83 5.07 5.76 4.41 4.52 5.83 
CaseC 1.39 1.62 1.38 1.80 1.66 1.44 
29 29 29 29 29 29 
5.17 5.72 5.34 1.66 5.14 1.76 
CaseD 2.07 1.28 1.78 0.90 1.30 1.09 
29 29 29 29 29 29 
4.79 5.17 4.55 2.66 4.41 3.79 
CaseE 2.16 1.83 2.11 1.47 1.27 1.32 
29 29 29 29 29 28 
4.93 5.17 4.76 4.17 4.28 5.46 
Case F 2.02 1.75 2.06 1.77 1.25 1.04 
29 29 29 29 29 28 
6.31 6.34 6.38 1.79 6.32 2.10 
CaseG 1.20 1.20 1.27 0.98 0.90 1.21 
29 29 29 29 28 29 
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A was rated as most typical. This case involves a man breaking into a house and removing 
valuables (jewelry, television, etc.). Selecting the case to be considered atypical was 
difficult. Case C was selected because it differed from Case A in that access to the home 
was not gained through a break-in (he entered through an open front door) and nothing was 
taken (he discovered somebody else was there). Two other cases were rated as 
significantly more atypical than Case C (Case D and Case G). However, these cases were 
not selected because multiple crimes were committed (not just burglary) and I did not want 
these other crimes to bias verdict decisions about the crime of burglary. Dependent-groups 
t-tests comparing ratings of certainty, typicality, likelihood of being found guilty, and 
harshness all revealed significant differences between Cases A and C. Subjects were more 
certain that the events described in Case A represented an instance of the crime of burglary 
than the events described in Case C, 1 (28) = -17 .22, 12 < .001. Case A was rated as more 
typical of burglary than Case C, 1 (28) = -11.60, 12 < .001. The criminal in Case A was 
rated as more likely to be found guilty, 1 (28) = -14.82, 12 < .001. Finally, Case A was 
rated as more harsh than Case C, 1 (28) = -5.39, 12 < .001. 
Criminals 
Since all subjects received the same person profiles, regardless of the crime they 
were to consider, all ratings were analyzed using a 2 (crime type - between subjects) X 8 
(order of presentation - between subjects) X 8 (profile - within subjects) mixed model 
analysis of variance. The mean ratings of each question for both assault and burglary are 
presented in Table 8 (a and b, respectively). The analyses on the ratings of the likelihood 
that the person described would commit the crime in question revealed a significant main 
effect for the profiles, F(7,49) = 98.03, n < .001. More importantly, however, the 
analyses on this question revealed a significant profile type by crime interaction, F(7 ,49) = 
7.44, n < .001, indicating that the likelihood that the person described would commit the 
crime depended upon which crime the subjects were considering. A similar pattern of 
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Table 8a. l: Ratings for criminal profiles - assault: Means (M), Standard 
Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Likelihood Typicality Certainty Typicality 
Rank 
Profile A M = 3.32 3.14 3.43 4.76 
s = 1.23 1.16 1.14 1.19 
n = 37 37 37 37 
Profile B 3.11 3.22 3.22 4.46 
1.63 1.64 1.58 1.54 
37 37 37 35 
Profile C 1.73 1.57 2.14 1.97 
0.99 0.90 1.46 1.19 
37 37 37 37 
Profile D 1.86 1.78 2.24 1.89 
1.25 1.25 1.46 1.07 
37 37 37 37 
Profile E 2.76 2.68 3.03 3.54 
1.30 1.13 1.44 1.28 
37 37 37 37 
Profile F 5.78 5.73 5.54 7.32 
1.25 1.15 1.17 0.71 
37 37 37 37 
Profile G 5.92 6.30 5.73 7.32 
1.01 0.91 1.28 0.88 
37 37 37 37 
Profile H 3.54 3.62 3.73 4.89 
1.17 1.30 1.28 1.54 
37 37 37 37 
Table 8a.2: Bipolar Ratings for Criminal Profiles - Assault: Means (M), Standard 
Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
calm- virtuous not- smart- not- not-
angry -evil desper dumb deceptiv aggres 
Profile M=5.00 4.54 5.76 5.81 5.78 4.46 
A s=l .39 1.10 1.23 0.97 1.53 1.26 
n=37 37 37 37 37 37 
Profile 5.27 5.14 6.05 5.51 5.73 5.32 
B 1.15 1.18 0.85 1.30 1.45 1.13 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Profile 6.59 5.68 5.11 4.38 4.78 6.70 
c 0.72 1.20 1.31 1.34 1.67 0.70 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Profile 6.70 5.84 5.19 4.46 4.43 6.84 
D 0.52 1.17 1.33 1.02 1.68 0.44 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Profile E 4.11 4.84 5.97 3.81 5.05 5.03 
1.51 1.12 1.21 1.05 1.39 1.59 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Profile F 2.84 2.14 3.08 1.30 2.95 3.84 
1.52 0.98 1.44 0.66 1.65 1.77 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Profile 1.78 2.08 2.00 2.46 2.76 2.59 
G 0.79 1.12 1.08 1.32 1.36 1.44 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Profile 5.24 4.68 4.92 3.86 4.62 5.59 
H 1.14 1.00 1.26 1.06 1.42 1.24 
37 37 37 37 37 37 
Note: v1rtu-evil refers to the v1rtuous-ev1l bipolar adJectve ratmg; not-desper refers to the 
desperate-not desperate bipolar rating; smart-dumb refers to the intelligent-unintelligent 
bipolar rating; not-decept refers to the deceptive-not deceptive bipolar rating; and, not-
aggress refers to the aggressive-not aggressive bipolar rating. 
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Table 8b.1. -- Mean Ratings for Criminal Profiles - Burglary: Means (M), Standard 
Deviations (s) and Cell Sizes (n) 
Likelihood Typicality Certainty Typicality 
Rank 
Profile A M=3.1 3.05 2.92 3.61 
s= 1.36 1.35 1.05 1.55 
n=38 38 38 38 
Profile B 1.87 1.92 2.03 1.63 
1.38 1.15 1.21 1.05 
38 38 37 38 
Profile C 3.05 3.05 2.95 3.70 
1.61 1.54 1.39 1.90 
38 38 38 37 
Profile D 3.08 2.89 3.26 3.89 
1.60 1.35 1.39 1.66 
38 38 38 38 
Profile E 3.42 3.63 3.45 4.46 
1.27 1.40 1.16 1.39 
38 38 38 37 
Profile F 6.00 5.87 5.84 7.08 
1.25 1.30 1.28 1.42 
38 38 38 38 
Profile G 6.26 6.42 6.16 7.30 
1.16 1.08 1.24 1.41 
38 38 38 37 
Profile H 3.82 3.82 3.63 4.30 
1.49 1.47 1.30 1.58 
38 38 38 37 
Table 8b.2: Bipolar Ratings for Criminal Profiles - Burglary: Means (M), 
Standard Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
calm- virtu- not- smart- not- not-
angry evil des per dumb decept aggress 
Profile M=5.03 4.84 5.97 5.47 6.26 5.11 
A s= 1.13 0.86 0.94 1.48 1.13 1.13 
n=38 38 38 38 38 38 
Profile 5.95 5.42 6.26 5.84 5.97 5.74 
B 1.09 1.06 1.20 0.86 1.28 1.13 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
Profile 6.68 5.89 4.87 4.76 5.34 6.76 
c 0.57 1.11 1.32 1.44 1.58 0.49 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
Profile 6.68 6.21 5.11 4.63 5.16 6.66 
D 0.57 0.93 1.25 1.26 1.44 0.58 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
Profile E 4.79 4.76 6.05 3.84 5.61 5.26 
1.47 0.97 1.23 1.05 1.28 1.31 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
Profile F 2.61 2.61 3.18 1.50 2.63 3.68 
1.42 1.41 1.75 0.92 1.48 2.07 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
Profile 1.66 2.47 2.13 2.16 2.47 2.26 
G 0.81 1.59 1.19 1.44 1.47 1.33 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
Profile 5.26 5.05 4.84 4.08 4.79 5.71 
H 1.18 0.98 1.22 1.00 1.30 0.98 
38 38 38 38 38 38 
Note: v1rtu-evtl refers to the v1rtuous-ev1l bipolar adJectve ratmg; not-desper refers to the 
desperate-not desperate bipolar rating; smart-dumb refers to the intelligent-unintelligent 
bipolar rating; not-decept refers to the deceptive-not deceptive bipolar rating; and, not-
aggress refers to the aggressive-not aggressive bipolar rating. 
effects was found for ratings of typicality (F(7,49) = 115.06, 12 < .001 for the profiles 
main effect, and F(7,49) = 8.75, 12 < .001 for the interaction) and also for ratings of 
certainty (F(7,49) = 88.19, 12 < .001 for the profiles main effect, and F(7,49) = 6.12, 
12 < .001 for the interaction). 
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In an effort to understand the nature of the interactions listed above, the two 
scenarios for each criminal category were combined to yield a single value for each 
category. Profiles A and B consisted of traits considered typical of a burglar; Profile C and 
D contained characteristics considered typical of an assaulter. Profiles E and H contained 
negative traits not listed as typical of either one of the two criminal types being considered, 
and Profiles F and G consisted of positive characteristics. Scores for the two profiles of 
each person type were combined and these combined scores were compared. 
When these scores were compared across the crime types using independent groups 
1 tests (using 12 < .001 as the significance level to correct for the large number of 
comparisons being made), only the assault profiles differed in their likelihood of guilt 
ratings between the two crime types where these persons were rated as more likely to be 
found guilty of assault than burglary, 1 (73) = 4.45, 12 < .001. The same pattern of results 
was found for typicality ratings where assault profiles were rated as more typical of 
assaulters than burglars, 1 (73) = 5.16, 12 < .001. However, in terms of the certainty that 
the person described would commit the crime, the burglary profiles differed between the 
two crimes with burglary profiles increasing the certainty that this person would commit 
burglary, 1 (72) = 3.67, J2 < .001. None of the other comparisons reached significance. 
That the burglary profiles did not differ significantly across the crimes is not a large 
mystery once the mean values for the two profiles (Profiles A and B) which comprised the 
composite scores are compared. Ratings for Profile B are consistent with what was 
expected, while the ratings for Profile A for the crime of burglary are very similar to the 
ratings made for the two assault profiles, and opposite to what was expected. Thus Profile 
B seemed the obvious choice for the stereotypical burglar. Profile C was chosen as the 
stereotypical assaulter since, when compared to Profile D, the person described was rated 
as more typical of an assaulter and less typical of a burglar, though not significantly so. 
Profile H was chosen for the profile containing negative traits and Profile G was chosen as 
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the profile with positive traits. These were chosen primarily to maximze the plausibility of 
the final study's stimulus materials. 
In order to make sure that the profiles chosen truly differ on the important 
dimensions, several comparisons were made. The results of these tests are displayed in 
Tables 9, 10, and 11. Each of the tables displays the mean differences between the two 
scenarios being compared. Asterisks indicate differences which are significant at the .001 
level. The results show that the person possessing the traits typical of the average assaulter 
(Profile C) was indeed rated as more likely to be found guilty of assault than the others. 
This person was also rated as more typical of the average assaulter as compared to the other 
three profiles listed. Furthermore, subjects were significantly more certain that such a 
person would commit the crime of assault. A person possessing traits consistent with 
those listed in Study 1 as typical of a burglar was indeed judged as a) significantly more 
likely to be found guilty of a burglary than a person in any of the other three profiles; b) 
more typical of the average burglar than the other three; and, c) subjects were more certain 
that such a person would commit a burglary. Indeed, for either assaults or burglaries, 
consistency between traits and crime affected ratings of likelihood of guilt, typicality, and 
certainty. Inconsistency between stereotype and crime (for example, subjects given a 
profile of a person possessing traits consistent with a burglar and making judgments about 
this person committing an assault) led to ratings which were no different than ratings for a 
person possessing other negative traits. Persons possessing negative traits (typical 
assaulters, typical burglars, or three negative traits unrelated to either crime) were judged 
much more harshly than those possessing positive traits, regardless of the crime being 
asked about. 
Subjects were also asked to respond to six bipolar adjective pairs which represented 
the six traits considered consistent with either assault (anger, evil, and aggressiveness) or 
burglary (deception, desperation, and unintelligence). These six bipolar adjective ratings 
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Table 9a. -- Likelihood of guilt ratings for person profiles - Assault 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar -1.38* xxx 
Negative 
Person -1.81 * -0.43 xxx 
Positive 
Person -4.19* -2.81 * -2.38* xxx 
Table 9b. -- Likelihood of guilt ratings for person profiles - Burglary 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar 1.18* xxx 
Negative 
Person -0.76 -1.95* xxx 
Positive 
Person -3.21 * -4.39* -2.45* xxx 
Note: The values m the table represent column-row mean differences where negative 
difference scores indicates that the column profile had a stronger rating of the property than 
the row value. 
* indicates 12 < .001 
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Table 1 Oa: Typicality ratings for person profiles - Assault 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar -1.65* xxx 
Negative 
Person -2.05* -0.41 xxx 
Positive 
Person -4.73* -3.16* -2.67* xxx 
Table 1 Ob. -- Typicality ratings for person profiles - Burglary 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar 1.13* xxx 
Negative 
Person -0.76 -1.90* xxx 
Positive 
Person -3.37* -4.50* -2.61 * xxx 
Note: The values m the table represent column-row mean differences where negative 
difference scores indicates that the column profile had a stronger rating of the property than 
the row value. 
* indicates 12 < .001 
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Table I la. -- Certainty of committing crime ratings for person profiles - Assault 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar -1.08* xxx 
Negative 
Person -1.59* -0.51 xxx 
Positive 
Person -3.59* -2.51 * -2.00* xxx 
Table 11 b. -- Likelihood of guilt ratings for person profiles - Burglary 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar 0.95* xxx 
Negative 
Person -0.68 -1.59* xxx 
Positive 
Person -3.21* -4.11 * -2.53* xxx 
Note: The values m the table represent column-row mean differences where negative 
difference scores indicates that the column profile had a stronger rating of the property than 
the row value. 
* indicates J2 < .001 
for the four profiles above were entered into a mixed model analysis of variance as a 
within-subjects variable along with the crime variable as a between subjects factor. Order 
was not considered here because of the difficulty in controlling for the other profiles which 
were interspersed around these four profiles. The analyses revealed significant within-
subjects main effects for all six bipolar adjective ratings with no effects for crime. 
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Tables 12 - 17 show the difference scores between the different person profile type 
means for the six bipolar adjective ratings. These tables show that, for those properties 
considered typical of assault, the assault profile led to significantly stronger negative 
ratings. The person who possessed properties judged to be typical of an assaulter was seen 
as angrier, more aggressive, and more evil than any of the other person profiles presented. 
These are the properties which were reported to describe an assaulter. Similar findings 
were reported for the burglars. On dimensions not relevant to the stereotype (for example, 
anger in a burglar), ratings for the inconsistent criminal did not differ from those made for 
the profile describing a person with negative traits. These results indicate that subjects 
were attending to this information and were able to distinguish the differences between the 
profiles. 
The results of Study 1 demonstrated that people are able to list features which they 
associated with certain types of crimes and criminals and these lists showed consistency 
across subjects. The results of Study 2 demonstrate that when 
Table 12. -- Angry-calm bipolar ratings for person profiles 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar 1.02* xxx 
Negative 
Person 1.39* 0.36 xxx 
Positive 
Person 4.92* 3.89* 3.53* xxx 
Note: The values m the bipolar tables represent column-row mean differences where 
positive difference scores indicates that the column profile had a rating more towards the 
negative pole. 
Table 13. -- Evil-virtuous bipolar ratings for person profiles 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar 0.51 * xxx 
Negative 
Person 0.41 0.92* xxx 
Positive 
Person 3.00* 3.51 * 2.59* xxx 
Note: The values m the bipolar tables represent column-row mean differences where 
positive difference scores indicates that the column profile had a rating more towards the 
negative pole. 
Table 14. -- Desperate--non-desperate bipolar ratings for person profiles 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar -1.17* xxx 
Negative 
Person 0.11 1.28* xxx 
Positive 
Person 2.92* 4.09* 2.81 * xxx 
Note: The values m the bipolar tables represent column-row mean differences where 
positive difference scores indicates that the column profile had a rating more towards the 
negative pole. 
* indicates 12 < .001 
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Table 15. -- Unintelligent-intelligent bipolar ratings for person profiles 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar -1.11* xxx 
Negative 
Person 0.60 1.71 * xxx 
Positive 
Person 2.27* 3.37* 1.67* xxx 
Note: The values m the bipolar tables represent column-row mean differences where 
positive difference scores indicates that the column profile had a rating more towards the 
negative pole. 
Table 16. -- Deceptive--non-deceptive bipolar ratings for person profiles 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar -0.79* xxx 
Negative 
Person 0.36 1.15* xxx 
Positive 
Person 2.45* 3.24* 2.09* xxx 
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Note: The values m the bipolar tables represent column-row mean differences 
where positive difference scores indicates that the column profile had a rating more towards 
the negative pole. 
* indicates n < .001 
Table 17. -- Aggressive--non-aggressive bipolar ratings for person profiles 
Typical Typical Negative Positive 
Assaulter Burglar Person Person 
Typical 
Assaulter xxx 
Typical 
Burglar 1.20* xxx 
Negative 
Person 1.08* -0.12 xxx 
Positive 
Person 4.31 * 3.11 * 3.23* xxx 
Note: The values m the bipolar tables represent column-row mean differences where 
positive difference scores indicates that the column profile had a rating more towards the 
negative pole. 
* indicates 12 < .001 
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the most frequently mentioned features were incorporated into crime scenarios or criminal 
profiles, ratings of typicality were affected. The crime scenarios containing those features 
considered typical of the crime were consistently rated as more typical instances of the 
crime than scenarios which did not possess those features. The findings of these two 
studies suggest that people may possess representations of crimes akin to prototypes, a 
central tendency representation of a crime category. However, an exemplar representation 
of these crime categories cannot be ruled out. However these crime categories are 
represented in memory, how people use these representations will be studied further. 
Smith ( 1991 a) suggests that these representations affect verdict decisions made by 
Jurors. Highly typical instances of a crime produced significantly more guilty verdicts than 
highly atypical (yet still legally defined) instances of a crime. One mechanism for how this 
could come about relies on the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1981, 1986, 1988, 
1992) where jurors compare their version of the evidence (their story) with the necessary 
requirements of guilt for different crimes. It is theorized that, through judicial instruction, 
jurors construct mental representations of the legal requirements for guilt for various crimes 
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and compare their stories with these mental representations. However, Smith (1991a) 
suggests that jurors have a difficult time comprehending judicial instruction. Thus, they 
rely on their own preconceived ideas as to the necessary requirements for guilt; in other 
words, those features considered typical of the crime. Basically, Smith (1991 a) argues that 
jurors compare the information before them to their prototypes of the crime category and, 
based upon the degree of similarity between target and prototype, make a determination of 
guilt or innocence. The mechanism of comparison is very similar to what Pennington and 
Hastie ( 1981, 1986, 1988, 1992) suggest in their Story Model. However, Smith suggests 
that the comparison of the facts of the case is to faulty representations of the crime 
category. 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein (1987) suggest that criminal stereotypes can also 
affect juridical decisions. They suggest that, when faced with a difficult task (like making a 
verdict or sentence decision), jurors also rely on criminal stereotypes as a gauge for the 
severity of the criminal behavior. They suggest, further, that jurors use stereotypes as a 
central theme around which the events of the crime are reconstructed. Information 
consistent with the stereotype is easier to incorporate into a coherent story. The results of 
studies 1 and 2 suggest that people possess representations for criminal types as well as 
crime types. In study 1, subjects were able to list features which they associated with 
certain types of criminals. The results of study 2 demonstrate that when the most 
frequently mentioned features were incorporated into criminal profiles, ratings of typicality 
were affected. The profiles containing those features considered typical of the criminal type 
were consistently rated as more typical instances of the criminal than profiles which did not 
possess those features. These findings suggest that people do possess stereotypes of 
certain types of criminals. Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein ( 1987) would suggest that these 
stereotypes would affect how people make juridical decisions. 
Using the Story Model as an organizational tool, the findings of Smith (1991a) and 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein ( 1987) suggest two places in the model where people's 
preconceived ideas can affect their verdict and/or sentence decisions. At the story 
construction stage, Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein would suggest that stereotypes are 
affecting how the story is constructed. At the verdict determination stage, Smith would 
suggest that faulty representations of crime categories affect the verdict chosen. To date, 
the interactive effects of criminal stereotypes and crime prototypes has not been assessed. 
Study 2 resulted in typical and atypical instances of both assaults and burglaries. 
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Also, the study yielded person profiles of varying typicality to the types of criminals who 
would commit these crimes. These crime scenarios were crossed with the profile types in a 
full factorial design yielding 16 different crime descriptions which were then used as the 
stimulus materials for Study 3. These scenarios differed in terms of the information about 
the criminal and information about the crime. With these scenarios, it is possible to 
examine the simultaneous influences of criminal information and crime information on 
verdict decisions. 
CHAPTER4 
STUDY3 
Overview 
Typical and atypical instances of the crimes of assault and burglary were selected 
from the pool of crime scenarios used in Study 2 based upon typicality ratings made by 
subjects. These four crime scenarios were crossed with four criminal profile types selected 
from the pool of profiles used in Study 2. These criminal profiles were selected based 
upon ratings of similarity with different criminal types. One profile described a person 
rated as typical of an assaulter, yet atypical of a burglar. A second profile described a 
person rated as typical of a burglar, yet atypical of an assaulter. The third profile described 
a person rated as equally similar of an assaulters as a burglar. Finally the fourth profile 
described a person considered atypical of both assaulters and burglars. Each criminal 
profile was matched with each of the four crime types resulting in 16 possible scenarios, 
which served as stim,ulus materials for the third study. Thus, Study 3 employed a 4 
(criminal profile type) X 2 (crime type: assault versus burglary) X 2 (typicality: typical 
versus atypical) factorial design. 
Method 
Subjects 
Three hundred twenty undergraduates of Loyola University Chicago (97 males and 
222 females, with one person not indicating his/her gender) participated in this study. All 
subjects were obtained through the use of sign-up folders placed outside the psychology 
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department and received course credit for their participation. 
Materials and Procedures 
On arrival, participants were told that the experiment concerned the factors which 
affect verdict and sentence decisions. They were told further that they would read a brief 
scenario and be asked to make a verdict decision and answer some questions about what 
they had read. Participants were then given the packet of materials to be used in this study. 
These packets consisted of a brief (two paragraph) description of a person and an activity 
that in which this person engaged. 
The first paragraph described, through the supposed testimony of friends, co-
workers, and acquaintances, the person on trial for the crime in question. Four different 
types of person descriptions were used. One description described a person who 
possessed traits consistent with what was considered typical of the average assaulter. Here 
the person was described as angry, malevolent, and aggressive. A second description 
described a person who possessed traits consistent with what was considered typical of the 
average burglar. Here, the person was described as being desperate, deceitful, and 
possessing low intelligence. A third description described a person who possessed three 
negative traits not considered typical of either an assaulter or a burglar. Here, the person 
was described as possessive, obnoxious, and unpopular. The final description described a 
person who possessed three positive traits not considered consistent of either an assaulter 
or a burglar (or, for that matter, any criminal). Here, the person was described as easy-
going, a hard-worker, and coming from a positive background. These person descriptions 
were selected based upon ratings made in Study 2. Each subject read one of these four 
person descriptions. 
The second paragraph described a criminal activity in which this person supposedly 
engaged. Again, there were four possible crime descriptions which subjects could have 
read. Two of the descriptions described an alleged assault. One of these assault 
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descriptions was rated in Study 2 as highly typical of the average assault (the sexual assault 
of a jogger where the assailant caused injury to the victim), and the other was rated as less 
typical of the average assault (the assailant threatening his landlord with a weapon). The 
other two descriptions described an alleged burglary. Again, based upon ratings made in 
Study 2, one description was considered typical of the average burglary (a man breaking 
into a home and taking valuables), and the other description was considered less typical of 
the average burglary (a man entering a house, without breaking in, intent on stealing 
valuables, but not being able to take anything). Each subject read one of these four crime 
descriptions. 
In total, all subjects read one of 16 possible scenarios, comprised of one of the four 
person descriptions and one of the four crime descriptions. After reading the scenario, 
subjects were asked to make a verdict decision (indicate whether or not they thought the 
person was guilty of the crime in question). Then, subjects were asked to assume that the 
person was found guilty and make a sentence judgment by providing a number between 1 
and 25 which would indicate the number of years that this person should spend in jail 
without parole. After making these two determinations, subjects were asked some 
questions about what they had read. First, they considered the criminal activity. Questions 
similar to those posed in Study 2 were asked of the subjects here. The first question 
addressed the subjects' degree of certainty that the crime in question was actually 
committed, with the scale ranging from 1 (absolutely certain the crime was committed) to 7 
(absolutely certain the crime was not committed). The second question concerned ratings 
of typicality, with the scale ranging from 1 (highly typical) to 7 (highly atypical). The third 
question asked subjects to rate the likelihood that a jury would find this person guilty of the 
crime in question, with the scale ranging from 1 (extremely likely) to 7 (extremely 
unlikely). Finally, subjects were given a series of 6 bipolar adjective pairs and asked rate 
the criminal activity in terms of these characteristics. The adjective pairs measured the 
harshness, severity, desperation, heinousness, deceptiveness, and aggressiveness of the 
criminal behavior. 
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Subjects then answered questions about the person described. These questions 
were the same as those posed in Study 2. The first question asked subjects to rate the 
likelihood that a person similar to the person described would commit the crime in question 
(either assault or burglary), with the scale ranging from 1 (extremely likely) to 7 (extremely 
unlikely). Subjects were then asked to rate the degree to which they perceived the person 
described as typical of the average assaulter or burglar, with the scale ranging from 
l(highly typical) to 7 (highly atypical). The final question asked subjects to rate their 
degree of certainty that this person would commit the crime in question again at a later date, 
with the scale ranging from 1 (extremely certain he would commit the crime) to 7 
(extremely certain he would not commit the crime). After answering these questions, 
subjects were also asked to respond to a series of adjective pairs presented as semantic-
differential questions where bipolar adjective pairs were separated by a seven-point scale. 
The bipolar adjective pairs used were angry--calm, evil--virtuous, unintelligent--intelligent, 
deceptive--non-deceptive, aggressive--non-aggressive, and desperate--non-desperate. 
Finally, subjects were asked to rate their agreement with a series of statements on 
scales ranging from 1 (strongly agree) to 7 (strongly disagree). These five statements 
were: 1. The person described is a threat to himself; 2. the person described is a threat to 
society; 3. the person's actions can be attributed to his personality; 4. the person's actions 
can be attributed to his environment; and, 5. the person should be held responsible for his 
actions. After providing the information requested, subjects were debriefed and eventually 
dismissed. 
Results 
Verdict Decisions 
Verdict decisions were analyzed using a 2 (typical vs. atypical crime) x 2 (crime 
type: assault vs. burglary) x 4 (criminal type: typical assaulter, typical burglar, negative 
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person, and positive person) log-linear analysis. The results of this analysis are reported in 
Table 18. The G2 values and associated probabilities presented in Table 18 show the 
degree of fit of each of the models in the hierarchy. The change in G2 column indicates the 
relative increase in model fit by adding each term to the model. As shown in Table 18, the 
best-fitting model (I!< .20) included the three main effects and the typicality x crime type 
interaction. Of the main effects, typicality and crime type significantly increased the degree 
of fit when added. The typicality x crime type interaction was also significant. This 
analysis revealed that typical crimes resulted in proportionally more guilty verdicts than 
atypical crimes (.89 for typical crimes and .54 for atypical crimes). Also, assaults resulted 
in more guilty verdicts (prop. = .88) than burglaries (prop. = .54). 
Table 18. -- Results of Log-Linear Analysis for Verdict Decisions 
l\1odel df G2~~~P'--~~~==G2~~~P~<"--~-
Base 15 
Typicality 14 
Crime 13 
Criminal 10 
Typicality X Crime 9 
Typicality X Criminal 6 
Crime X Criminal 3 
Typicality X Crime X Criminal 0 
133. 21 .000 
83.17 .000 
27.42 .011 
20.13 .028 
10.87 .285 
10.48 .106 
0.39 .943 
0.00 1.000 
50.04 
55.75 
7.29 
9.26 
0.39 
10.09 
0.39 
.001 
.001 
.100 
.010 
n.s. 
.025 
n.s. 
Note: The base model is the starting point of a log-linear analysis and assumes that all 
design factors are independent of the response factor. 
To investigate the interaction term, two separate 2 (typical vs. atypical crime) X 4 
(criminal types) log-linear analyses were performed, one for assaults and one for 
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burglaries. For assault, the base model of the log-linear analysis could not be rejected 
statistically as fitting the data, indicating that there were no effects of typicality or criminal 
type on the verdict decisions in the assault cases. For burglary, the best fitting model 
contained only the effect for typicality (G2 = 5.32, 12 > .20) with the results indicating a 
large effect of typicality on verdict decisions in the burglary cases (.l'.1 G2(1) = 58.54, 12 < 
.001). Typical burglaries resulted in a significantly higher proportion of guilty verdicts 
(.85) than atypical burglaries (prop. = .24). The proportions of guilty verdicts for each of 
the 16 cells in the design can be found in Table 19. 
Table 19. -- Proportion and Number of Guilty Verdicts 
Criminal Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Information Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Total 
Typical 18 (.90) 16 (.80) 15 (.75) 2 (.10) 51 (.64) 
Assaulter 
Typical 20 (1.00) 20 (l.00) 17 (.85) 6 (.30) 63 (.79) 
Burglar 
Negative 19 (.95) 16 (.80) 18 (.90) 6 (.30) 59 (.74) 
Person 
Positive 17 (.85) 15 (.75) 18 (.90) 5 (.25) 55 (.69) 
Person 
Total 74 (.93) 67 (.84) 68 (.85) 19 (.24) 228 (.72) 
Sentence Decisions 
The remaining questions were analyzed via a 2 (crime type: assault vs. burglary) x 
2 (typicality of crime) x 4 (criminal type) analysis of variance, and the 
cell means for these questions can be found in Table 20a - 20x. Because of the large 
number of dependent variables considered, a significance level of 12 < .001 will be used as 
the criterion for significance, with effects where 12 < .01 being discussed as trends. 
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Table 20a. -- Sentence Rating Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=7.95 4.84 7.05 2.34 5.56 
Assaulter s=5.55 5.57 5.83 2.27 5.41 
n=20 19 20 19 78 
Typical 11.00 4.00 5.25 3.95 5.99 
Burglar 7.61 5.44 3.85 5.23 6.26 
19 20 20 20 79 
Negative 10.65 4.60 4.97 3.75 6.01 
Person 8.11 5.49 3.47 4.51 6.20 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 9.45 3.53 4.10 2.10 4.79 
Person 6.50 3.49 2.38 1.74 4.80 
20 20 20 20 80 
Average 9.77 4.23 5.34 3.02 5.59 
6.97 4.99 4.14 3.77 5.69 
79 79 80 79 317 
Note: Values represent the number of years the defendant should spend in prison. 
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Table 20b. -- Certainty of Crime Rating Means (M), Standard Deviations (s) and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=2.50 3.45 2.70 5.50 3.54 
Assaulter s=l.61 1.61 1.45 1.28 1.89 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 1.60 2.80 2.40 4.45 2.81 
Burglar 0.82 1.28 1.50 1.76 1.71 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 2.40 3.40 2.45 5.25 3.38 
Person 1.23 1.57 1.50 1.33 1.81 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 2.15 3.30 2.80 5.25 3.38 
Person 1.46 1.81 1.67 1.59 1.98 
20 20 20 20 80 
2.16 3.24 2.59 5.11 3.28 
Average 1.34 1.57 1.52 1.53 1.86 
80 80 80 80 320 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate more certamty. 
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Table 20c. -- Typicality of Crime Rating Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical 3.25 3.10 2.10 5.25 3.43 
Assaulter 1.25 1.33 0.91 1.68 1.73 
20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 2.85 3.05 2.90 4.65 3.36 
Burglar 1.39 1.36 1.52 1.66 1.64 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 2.85 3.80 2.45 5.30 3.60 
Person 1.53 1.54 1.19 1.30 1.76 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 2.50 3.85 3.20 5.00 3.64 
Person 1.24 1.79 1.91 1.17 1.79 
20 20 20 20 80 
Average 2.86 3.45 2.66 5.05 3.51 
1.36 1.53 1.47 1.47 1.73 
80 80 80 80 320 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger typ1cahty ratmgs. 
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Table 20d. -- Likelihood that a Jury Will Find for Guilt: Means (M), Standard 
Deviaitons (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=2.25 3.25 2.75 5.30 3.39 
Assaulter s= 1.62 1.52 1.65 1.56 1.95 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 2.30 2.50 2.40 4.60 2.95 
Burglar 1.22 1.32 1.27 1.14 1.55 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 2.65 3.10 2.60 4.65 3.25 
Person 1.23 1.71 1.35 1.66 1.70 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 2.70 3.80 3.00 5.60 3.77 
Person 1.78 1.79 1.49 1.14 1.92 
20 20 20 20 80 
2.48 3.16 2.69 5.04 3.34 
Average 1.47 1.63 1.44 1.44 1.80 
80 80 80 80 320 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger hkehhood ratmgs. 
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Table 20e. -- Crime Bipolar - Harshness: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=6.26 6.50 4.85 3.55 5.28 
Assaulter s=0.99 0.89 1.63 1.67 1.78 
n=19 20 20 20 79 
Typical 6.25 6.10 4.30 3.80 5.11 
Burglar 0.79 0.85 1.49 1.79 1.68 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 6.50 6.15 4.80 4.00 5.38 
Person 0.69 1.04 1.44 2.08 1.70 
20 20 20 19 79 
Positive 6.35 5.70 3.70 3.20 4.74 
Person 0.93 1.45 1.87 1.32 1.93 
20 20 20 20 80 
6.34 6.11 4.41 3.63 5.13 
Average 0.85 1.10 1.65 1.73 1.79 
79 80 80 79 318 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate stronger harshness ratmgs. 
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Table 20f. -- Crime Bipolar - Heinousness: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), 
and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=5.05 4.53 4.37 3.60 4.38 
Assaulter s=l .54 1.35 1.42 1.47 1.51 
n=20 19 19 20 78 
Typical 4.75 4.00 4.20 4.30 4.32 
Burglar 1.77 1.08 1.51 1.53 1.50 
20 18 20 20 78 
Negative 5.47 4.94 4.30 3.95 4.66 
Person 1.35 1.30 1.49 1.47 1.50 
19 18 20 19 76 
Positive 4.85 4.06 4.00 3.42 4.09 
Person 1.57 1.21 1.57 1.17 1.46 
20 18 18 19 75 
5.03 4.38 4.22 3.82 4.36 
Average 1.56 1.28 1.47 1.43 1.50 
79 73 77 78 307 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate stronger hemousness ratmgs. 
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Table 20g. -- Crime Bipolar - Desperation: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), 
and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=5.21 4.30 4.10 4.15 4.43 
Assaulter s=l .69 2.13 1.86 1.87 1.91 
n=19 20 20 20 79 
Typical 5.60 4.90 5.20 5.40 5.28 
Burglar 1.82 1.62 1.74 1.76 1.72 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 5.30 5.60 4.55 4.70 5.04 
Person 1.49 1.43 1.73 1.98 1.69 
20 20 20 80 80 
Positive 5.40 5.45 3.35 4.15 4.59 
Person 1.70 1.50 2.06 1.73 1.94 
20 20 20 20 80 
5.38 5.06 4.30 4.60 4.83 
Average 1.65 1.74 1.94 1.87 1.84 
79 80 80 80 319 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate stronger desperat10n ratmgs. 
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Table 20h. -- Crime Bipolar - Severity: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=5.80 6.05 4.85 3.50 5.05 
Assaulter s=l.51 1.00 1.60 1.24 1.67 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 6.20 5.55 4.15 4.10 5.00 
Burglar 1.01 1.00 1.46 1.74 1.60 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 5.95 5.80 5.10 4.21 5.28 
Person 1.23 1.11 1.55 1.81 1.58 
20 20 20 19 79 
Positive 6.00 5.15 4.00 3.65 4.70 
Person 1.12 1.50 1.95 1.63 1.81 
20 20 20 20 80 
5.99 5.64 4.53 3.86 5.01 
Average 1.22 1.19 1.68 1.62 1.67 
80 80 80 79 319 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate stronger seventy ratmgs. 
83 
Table 20i. -- Crime Bipolar - Deceptive: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=4.89 4.25 5.45 5.20 4.90 
Assaulter s=2.13 1.45 1.36 1.96 1.78 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 5.20 4.15 5.30 5.00 4.91 
Burglar 1.61 1.35 1.30 1.65 1.53 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 4.63 4.00 5.90 5.10 4.91 
Person 1.64 1.95 1.12 1.12 1.63 
19 20 20 20 79 
Positive 5.50 3.58 4.45 4.55 4.53 
Person 1.47 1.71 2.01 1.57 1.80 
20 19 20 20 79 
5.01 4.00 5.28 4.96 4.81 
Average 1.74 1.62 1.55 1.59 1.69 
79 79 80 80 318 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate stronger deceptiveness ratmgs. 
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Table 20j. -- Crime Bipolar - Aggressiveness: Means (M), Standard Deviations 
(s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=5.95 6.60 5.65 3.40 5.40 
Assaulter s=l.76 0.94 1.31 2.09 1.97 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 6.45 6.30 3.40 3.30 4.86 
Burglar 0.76 0.66 1.88 1.75 2.04 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 6.80 6.40 5.05 4.47 5.70 
Person 0.52 0.88 1.93 1.65 1.64 
20 20 20 19 79 
Positive 6.60 6.05 3.70 2.70 4.76 
Person 0.68 0.83 1.92 1.66 2.11 
20 20 20 20 80 
Average 6.45 6.34 4.45 3.46 5.18 
1.08 0.84 1.98 1.87 1.98 
80 80 80 79 319 
Note: Higher numbers mdicate stronger aggressiveness ratmgs. 
85 
Table 20k. -- Likelihood That Person Like Him Would Commit the Crime: 
Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=2.90 2.15 3.35 2.55 2.74 
Assaulter s=l .48 1.09 1.04 1.19 1.27 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 2.85 2.80 2.90 2.60 2.79 
Burglar 1.50 1.40 1.07 1.14 1.27 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 3.40 2.50 3.50 2.95 3.09 
Person 1.19 1.05 1.24 1.36 1.25 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 3.95 4.45 4.55 4.70 4.42 
Person 1.58 1.36 1.19 1.53 1.42 
19 20 20 20 79 
3.27 2.97 3.58 3.20 3.25 
Average 1.48 1.50 1.27 1.56 1.47 
79 80 80 80 319 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger hkehhood ratmgs. 
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Table 201. -- Typicality of Criminal: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=3.10 2.45 3.40 3.25 3.05 
Assaulter s=l.37 0.89 0.99 1.41 1.22 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 2.70 2.65 3.15 3.65 3.04 
Burglar 1.38 1.39 1.23 1.09 1.32 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 3.05 3.05 2.95 4.00 3.26 
Person 1.05 1.61 1.15 1.56 1.40 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 4.26 4.60 5.45 5.10 4.86 
Person 1.45 1.39 1.28 1.17 1.37 
19 20 20 20 79 
3.27 3.19 3.74 4.00 3.55 
Average 1.42 1.57 1.52 1.47 1.53 
79 80 80 80 319 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger typ1cahty ratmgs. 
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Table 20m. -- Certainty That Criminal Would Commit Again: Means (M), 
Standard Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=2.55 2.25 3.40 2.95 2.79 
Assaulter s=l.10 0.72 0.88 1.23 1.08 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 2.15 2.50 2.95 2.70 2.58 
Burglar 0.93 1.24 1.05 1.26 1.14 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 2.70 2.85 2.65 3.15 2.84 
Person 1.30 1.18 1.27 1.18 1.23 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 2.95 3.50 4.20 4.10 3.70 
Person 0.91 1.10 1.20 1.37 1.24 
19 20 20 20 79 
2.58 2.77 3.30 3.23 2.97 
Average 1.09 1.16 1.24 1.35 1.24 
79 80 80 80 319 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger certamty ratmgs. 
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Table 20n. -- Criminal Bipolar - Calrn/ Angry: Means (M), Standard Deviations 
(s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical Average 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary 
Type 
Typical M=6.15 6.80 5.65 5.15 5.94 
Assaulter s=l .04 0.41 1.14 1.57 1.26 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 5.95 6.35 4.45 4.80 5.39 
Burglar 1.00 0.59 1.36 1.47 1.38 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 6.00 6.45 4.95 4.11 5.39 
Person 1.12 0.60 1.39 0.88 1.37 
20 20 20 19 79 
Positive 4.79 5.80 3.05 2.80 4.10 
Person 1.58 1.20 1.73 1.06 1.87 
19 20 20 20 79 
Average 5.73 6.35 4.53 4.22 5.21 
1.30 0.83 1.69 1.55 1.63 
79 80 80 79 318 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate more anger. 
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Table 200. -- Criminal Bipolar - Virtuous/Evil: Means (M), Standard Deviations 
(s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=5.50 5.40 4.95 5.05 5.23 
Assaulter s=0.89 1.10 0.83 0.69 0.90 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 5.30 4.65 4.50 4.55 4.75 
Burglar 1.13 1.14 0.83 1.05 1.07 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 5.20 4.85 4.95 4.90 4.98 
Person 1.11 0.88 1.10 1.17 1.06 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 5.00 4.30 4.00 3.45 4.18 
Person 0.88 1.17 1.41 1.05 1.26 
19 20 20 20 79 
5.25 4.80 4.60 4.49 4.78 
Average 1.01 1.13 1.12 1.17 1.14 
79 80 80 80 319 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate more ev1l-ness. 
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Table 20p. -- Criminal Bipolar - Not Desperate/Desperate: Means (M), Standard 
Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=5.47 4.75 4.30 4.70 4.80 
Assaulter s=l.35 1.80 1.72 1.34 1.60 
n=19 20 20 20 79 
Typical 6.00 5.60 5.20 5.65 5.61 
Burglar 1.34 1.05 1.51 1.50 1.36 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 5.55 5.90 5.05 5.11 5.41 
Person 1.50 0.91 1.67 1.76 1.51 
20 20 20 19 79 
Positive 4.74 5.20 3.42 4.05 4.36 
Person 1.94 1.36 1.92 1.64 1.82 
19 20 19 20 78 
5.45 5.36 4.51 4.87 5.05 
Average 1.58 1.37 1.82 1.64 1.65 
78 80 79 79 316 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate more desperation. 
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Table 20q. -- Criminal Bipolar Unintelligent/Intelligent: Means (M), Standard 
Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=4.35 4.75 4.05 4.60 4.44 
Assaulter s=l.09 1.12 1.54 1.43 1.31 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 5.10 5.35 4.65 5.55 5.16 
Burglar 1.17 0.81 1.50 0.89 1.15 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 4.40 4.75 3.30 4.60 4.26 
Person 1.31 1.25 1.78 1.39 1.53 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 3.32 4.20 3.15 4.00 3.67 
Person 1.25 1.24 1.66 1.69 1.52 
19 20 20 20 79 
4.30 4.76 3.79 4.69 4.39 
Average 1.34 1.17 1.70 1.46 1.48 
79 80 80 80 319 
Note: Higher numbers md1cate less mtelhgence. 
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Table 20r. -- Criminal Bipolar - Not Deceptive/Deceptive: Means (M), Standard 
Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=5.00 5.10 5.15 5.15 5.10 
Assaulter s=l.78 1.25 1.35 1.46 1.45 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 4.65 4.45 5.00 4.80 4.72 
Burglar 2.03 1.32 1.26 1.82 1.62 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 4.95 4.20 5.65 4.95 4.94 
Person 1.43 1.77 1.18 1.35 1.51 
19 20 20 19 78 
Positive 5.32 4.10 4.85 4.50 4.68 
Person 1.57 1.59 1.57 1.15 1.57 
19 20 20 20 79 
4.97 4.46 5.16 4.85 4.86 
Average 1.71 1.52 1.42 1.46 1.54 
78 80 80 79 317 
Note: Higher numbers mdicate more deceptiveness. 
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Table 20s. -- Criminal Bipolar - Not Aggressive/Aggressive: Means (M), Standard 
Deviations (s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=6.55 6.20 5.85 4.90 5.87 
Assaulter s=0.76 1.70 1.09 1.74 1.50 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 6.10 5.80 4.00 3.95 4.96 
Burglar 1.21 1.28 1.41 2.04 1.80 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 6.25 6.50 4.85 4.47 5.53 
Person 1.65 0.69 1.60 1.43 1.62 
20 20 20 19 79 
Positive 5.63 5.40 2.95 2.70 4.15 
Person 1.67 1.67 1.57 1.42 2.06 
19 20 20 20 79 
6.14 5.98 4.41 4.00 5.13 
Average 1.38 1.43 1.77 1.85 1.87 
79 80 80 79 318 
Note: Higher numbers mdicate more aggressiveness. 
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Table 20t. -- Threat to Self Rating: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=3.45 2.05 3.25 3.35 3.03 
Assaulter s=l.79 0.89 1.45 1.23 1.47 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 2.30 2.70 3.65 3.20 2.96 
Burglar 1.22 1.45 1.66 1.58 1.55 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 3.80 2.25 3.75 2.90 3.17 
Person 1.61 1.29 1.52 1.62 1.62 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 4.25 3.25 4.10 4.80 4.10 
Person 1.59 1.74 1.86 1.58 1.75 
20 20 20 20 80 
3.45 2.56 3.69 3.56 3.32 
Average 1.70 1.43 1.63 1.65 1.66 
80 80 80 80 320 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger threat to self ratmgs. 
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Table 20u. -- Threat to Society Ratings: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), and 
Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=l.90 1.70 2.15 2.70 2.11 
Assaulter s=l.02 0.80 1.35 1.08 1.13 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 1.70 2.25 2.80 2.45 2.30 
Burglar 0.80 1.02 1.28 1.19 1.14 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 1.75 1.90 2.20 2.85 2.18 
Person 0.97 0.64 1.44 1.31 1.19 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 2.50 2.55 3.20 4.20 3.11 
Person 1.57 1.10 1.85 1.36 1.62 
20 20 20 20 80 
1.96 2.10 2.59 3.05 2.43 
Average 1.15 0.95 1.53 1.40 1.34 
80 80 80 80 320 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger threat to society ratmgs. 
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Table 20v. -- Dispositional Attribution Ratings: Means (M), Standard Deviations 
(s), and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=3.05 1.75 3.05 3.25 2.78 
Assaulter s=l.19 0.64 1.32 1.59 1.35 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 2.60 2.85 3.00 2.20 2.66 
Burglar 1.31 1.79 1.26 1.01 1.38 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 2.90 2.35 2.65 3.10 2.75 
Person 1.45 1.18 1.27 1.59 1.38 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 4.05 4.45 4.55 4.20 4.31 
Person 1.57 1.93 1.67 1.58 1.67 
20 20 20 20 80 
3.15 2.85 3.31 3.19 3.13 
Average 1.47 1.77 1.55 1.60 1.60 
80 80 80 80 320 
. . Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger dispositional attnbut1ons . 
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Table 20w. -- Attributions of Responsibility: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), 
and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=l.25 1.45 1.55 2.05 1.58 
Assaulter s=0.44 0.83 1.47 1.39 1.13 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 1.15 1.50 2.10 1.65 1.60 
Burglar 0.37 0.61 1.74 1.35 1.19 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 1.40 1.30 1.15 1.85 1.43 
Person 1.14 0.57 0.37 1.14 0.90 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 1.45 1.80 2.25 2.15 1.91 
Person 1.36 1.11 2.00 1.39 1.50 
20 20 20 20 80 
1.31 1.51 1.76 1.92 1.63 
Average 0.92 0.81 1.56 1.31 1.21 
80 80 80 80 320 
. . Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger attnbutions of respons1b1hty . 
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Table 20x. -- Situational Attribution Ratings: Means (M), Standard Deviations (s), 
and Sample Sizes (n) 
Typical Atypical Typical Atypical 
Criminal Assault Assault Burglary Burglary Average 
Type 
Typical M=4.10 2.90 3.05 3.80 3.46 
Assaulter s=l.89 1.62 1.36 1.44 1.64 
n=20 20 20 20 80 
Typical 3.85 3.05 4.20 3.10 3.55 
Burglar 1.95 1.70 1.47 1.55 1.72 
20 20 20 20 80 
Negative 3.95 3.45 3.45 3.70 3.64 
Person 1.54 1.76 1.70 1.08 1.53 
20 20 20 20 80 
Positive 3.58 4.20 3.80 3.95 3.89 
Person 1.80 1.64 1.54 1.67 1.65 
19 20 20 20 79 
3.87 3.40 3.63 3.64 3.63 
Average 1.78 1.73 1.55 1.46 1.64 
79 80 80 80 319 
Note: Lower numbers md1cate stronger s1tuat1onal attnbut10ns. 
Analyses on sentence ratings revealed significant main effects for crime type (F( 1,299) = 
23.73, ll < .001) and typicality (F(l,299) = 45.81, ll < .001). Assaults (M = 6.98) were 
given longer average sentences than burglaries (M = 4.20); and, typical crimes (M = 7.53) 
were given longer sentences than atypical crimes (M = 3.63). Furthermore, the analysis 
revealed a significant crime by typicality interaction, F(l,299) = 7.74, ll < .01. Due to the 
large number of comparisons being made, only those simple effects where ll < .001 will be 
considered significant. Simple effects analyses (see Table 20a for sentence means) 
revealed that typical crimes led to longer average sentences than atypical crimes (1 ( 156) = 
5.74, ll < .001 for typical versus atypical assaults, and 1 (157) = 3.66, ll < .001, for typical 
versus atypical burglaries). Comparisons between crimes revealed that the average 
sentence for typical assaults was significantly longer than the average sentence for typical 
burglaries (1(157)=4.88, 12 < .001), while sentences did not differ in length for atypical 
assaults and atypical burglaries (12 > .05). Contrary to initial expectations, no effects or 
interactions involving the criminal descriptions on sentence length were found. 
Behavioral Ratings 
99 
Subjects' ratings of the criminal behavior were analyzed next. First, subjects were 
asked to rate the degree they were certain that the crime was committed. Analyses revealed 
a significant main effect for the crime type, F(l,299) = 47.33, 12 < .001. Assaults 
(M = 2.71) tended to lead to higher degrees of certainty than burglaries (M = 3.85). Also, 
a main effect for typicality was found, F(l,299) = 115.47, 12 < .001. Subjects tended to be 
more certain about the commission of typical crimes (M = 2.39) than atypical crimes 
(M = 4.18). However, interpretation of these two main effects is affected by the presence 
of a significant crime type by typicality interaction, F(l,299) = 20.459, 12 < .001. Simple 
effects analyses (see Table 20b for sentence means) revealed that subjects expressed more 
certainty about typical crimes than atypical crimes for both assaults (1(158)=4.67, 
12 < .001) and burglaries (1 (158) = 10.50, 12 < .001). Comparisons between crimes 
revealed that subjects expressed more certainty about atypical assaults than atypical 
burglaries (1 (158) = 7.66, 12 < .001). However, ratings of certainty for typical assaults did 
not differ frornratings of certainty for typical burglaries (12 > .05). No effects involveing 
the criminal descriptions were found on ratings of crime certainty. 
Subjects' ratings for the typicality of the crime were also analyzed. These analyses 
revealed a significant main effect for crime type, F(l,299) = 17.32, 12 < .001. Assaults 
tended to be rated as more typical on average (M = 3.17) than burglaries (M = 3.83). Also, 
the analyses revealed a significant main effect for typicality. Not surprisingly, typical 
crimes (M = 2.77) led to stronger ratings of typicality than atypical crimes (M = 4.23). 
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Interpretation of these main effects is affected by the presence of a crime type by typicality 
interaction, F(l ,299) = 30.61, 12 < .001. The mean typicality ratings are reported in Table 
20c. Simple efffects analyses revealed no significant difference of ratings of typicality 
between typical and atypical assaults. Typical burglaries received much stronger ratings of 
typicality than atypical burglaries (l ( 158) = 10.30, 12 < .001 ). Ratings of typicality did not 
differ between typical assaults and typical burglaries (l < 1.0). Finally, atypical assaults 
received stronger ratings of typicality than atypical burglaries (l (158) = 6.75, 12 < .001). 
To further investigate the association between typicality ratings and verdict choice, 
the subjects were divided into two groups according to their verdict choice, and analyses 
were done comparing the typicality ratings between those who voted guilty and those who 
voted not guilty. The results of these analyses was an effect for verdict choice on typicality 
ratings, l (318) = 9.14, 12 < .001. Those who voted guilty (M = 2.99) tended to perceive 
the crimes as more typical than those who voted not guilty (M = 4.77). This effect was 
observed for both crime types. For assaults, typicality ratings for those who voted guilty 
(M = 2.96) were significantly stronger than ratings made by those who voted not guilty 
(M = 4.58), l (158) = 4.56, 12 < .001. For burglaries, the mean typicality rating for the 
guilty group (3.05) was significantly stronger than that for the not guilty group (M = 4.82), 
l (158) = 6.70), 12 < .001. 
Subjects were also asked to rate what they thought the likelihood was that a jury 
would find this defendant guilty, the means for wich can be found in Table 20d. Analyses 
on this question revealed the same pattern of results seen in the other questions. A main 
effect for crime type was observed, F( 1,299) = 40.04, 12 < .001. Assaults (M = 2.82) led 
to greater likelihood ratings than burglaries (M = 3.86). A main effect for typicality was 
also revealed, F(l,299) = 86.43, 12 < .001. Typical crimes (M = 2.58) had stronger 
likelihood ratings than atypical crimes (M = 4.11 ). Again, there was a significant crime 
type by typicality interaction, F(l ,299) = 24.54, 12 < .001. Analysis of simple effects 
revealed a nearly significant difference in likelihood ratings between typical and atypical 
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assaults (1 (158) = 2.80, 12 < .01) and a much larger difference in likelihood ratings 
between typical and atypical burglaries (1 (158) = 10.35, 12 < .001). Comparisons across 
crimes revealed that likelihood ratings for typical assaults were no different than those for 
typical burglaries (1 < 1.0). However, the analysis revealed that atypical assaults resulted 
in stronger likelihood ratings than atypical burglaries (1(158)=7.71, 12 < .001). 
Subjects were then asked to rate the criminal behavior on a number of dimensions, 
and these ratings took the form of 7-points bipolar scales. These ratings were analyzed 
through a similar analysis of variance as the previous questions. The first such scale 
measured the perceived harshness of the criminal behavior, the means for which can be 
found in Table 20e. The analyses also revealed a main effect for crime types, F( 1,299) = 
202.01, 12 < .001. Assaults, on average (M = 6.22), were perceived as more harsh than 
burglaries (M = 4.02). Furthermore, a trend for typicality was also revealed, F(l ,299) = 
10.96, 12 < .005. Typical crimes (M = 5.36) appeared to be seen as more harsh than 
atypical crimes (M = 4.87). 
It should be noted that my understnding of atypicality was in terms of ratings made 
in Study 2 for these scenarios, where typicality was defined in terms of the number of 
associated features. Another meaning for "atypical" could refer to crimes that are extremely 
bizarre (such as cannibalism) and that would then, possibly, receive ratings on these 
dimensions that are more extreme than the "typical" crimes discussed here. All effects for 
typicality must be considered in the context of my interpretation of the term. 
The second scale measured the perceived heinousness of the behavior. Analyses on 
these ratings revealed significant main effects for the crime types (F( 1,299) = 17 .25, 
12 < .001) and typicality (F(l,299) = 9.64, 12 < .005). Assaults (M = 4.71) were rated as 
more heinous than burglaries (M = 4.02), and typical crimes (M = 4.62) were rated as 
more heinous than atypical crimes ( 4.09). The mean scores for this questions can be found 
in Table 20f. No other main effects or interactiosn reached significance. 
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The third scale measured the perceived desperation of the behavior, the mean values 
for which can be found in Table 20g. Analyses revealed only a significant main effect for 
crime type, F(l,299) = 13.17, 12 < .001. Assaults (M = 5.23) tended to be rated as more 
desperate than burglaries (M = 4.50). No other main effects or interactions reached 
significance. 
The fourth scale measured the perceived severity of the behavior. Analyses of these 
ratings revealed a significant main effect for the crime type, F(l,290) = 95.66, 12 < .001. 
Assaults (M = 5.77) were rated as more severe than burglaries (M = 4.16). The analyses 
also revealed a trend for typicality, F(l,290) = 9.45, 12 < .005. There was a tendency for 
subjects to rate typical crimes (M = 5.22) as more severe than atypical crimes (M = 4.68). 
The mean ratings for this question can be found in Table 20h. No other main effects or 
interactions reached significance. 
The fifth scale measured the perceived deceptiveness of the criminal behavior. 
Analyses on these ratings revealed a significant main effect for crime type, F(l ,290) = 
8.68, 12 < .005. Here, burglaries (M = 5.10) were rated as more deceptive behaviors than 
assaults (M = 4.57). Analyses also revealed a significant main effect for typicality, 
F(l ,290) = 12.50, 12 < .001. Typical crimes (M = 5.15) were rated as more deceptive than 
atypical crimes (M = 4.52). The mean values for this question can be found in Table 20i. 
The sixth scale measured the perceived aggressiveness of the behavior, the means 
for which can be found in Table 20j. Analyses on these ratings revealed a significant main 
effect for the person descriptions, F(3,290) = 8.66, 12 < .001. Post-hoc analyses (all 
reported post-hoc tests employed the Student-Newman-Keuls procedure with 12 < .05) 
revealed that the behaviors of the "negative person" were rated as more aggressive than 
those of the "typical burglar" or the "positive person," regardless of the type of behavior 
(or crime) being considered. Ratings of aggressiveness for the "negative person" and the 
"typical assaulter" did not differ. Analyses also revealed a significant main effect for crime 
type, F(l,290) = 226.15, 12 < .001. Here, assaults (M = 6.38) were rated as much more 
aggressive than burglaries (M = 3.92). Analyses also revealed a trend for typicality, 
F(l,290) = 10.82, 12 <.005. There was a tendency to rate typical crimes (M = 5.42) as 
more aggressive than atypical crimes (M = 4.83). 
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Interpretation of these main effects are affected by the presence of a number of 
interactions. Although not quite reaching the criterion for significance used in these 
analyses (i.e., 12 < .001), investigation of the person description by crime type interaction 
(F(3,290) = 5.88, 12 < .002) seems warranted. Simple effects analysis of this interaction 
revealed that across all four criminal types, assaults were rated as more aggressive than 
burglaries, the smallest effect being for the typical assaulter, 1 (78) = 4.41, 12 < .001. 
Oneway analyses of variance investigating differences in aggressiveness ratings across the 
four different criminal types for each of the crime types revealed that, for the crime of 
assault, no differences in perceived behavioral aggressiveness was found (F < 1.0). For 
burglaries, the analysis revealed a significant effect for the criminal types, F (3, 155) = 
7.21, 12 < .001. Post-hoes revealed that, while not differing from each other, the "typical 
assaulter" and the "negative person" both had their behaviors described as more aggressive 
than both the "typical burglar" and the "positive person." 
Finally, the analyses also revealed a significant three-way interaction, F(3,290) = 
4.92, 12 < .005. This interaction is displayed in Figure 1, which shows differences 
between assaults and burglaries across the four criminal types. Simple effects analyses 
revealed that ratings of aggressiveness did not differ for assaults or burglaries committed 
by the "typical assaulter" (1 < 1.0). Across the other three criminal types, typical assaults 
were consistently rated as more aggressive than typical burglaries (all differences, 
12 < .001). No differences were found across the four criminal types in ratings of 
aggressiveness for typical assaults, (F (3,76) = 2.39, 12 > .05). For typical burglaries, 
analysis revealed a significant effect for the criminal types, F (3,76) = 7.30, 12 < .001. 
Post-hoc tests revealed that a typical burglary committed by "typical assaulter" or a 
"negative person," while not differing from each other in rated aggressiveness, was rated 
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as more aggressive than the same behavior performed by a "typical burglar" or the "positive 
person" 
Figure 1. -- Crime Aggressiveness Ratings as a Function of Crime, Typicality, and 
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Criminal Profile Type 
which did not differ from each other. Analyses also showed that atypical assaults were 
consistently rated as more aggressive than atypical burglaries, across all four criminal types 
(all differences, 12 < .001 ). No differences were found in the rated aggressiveness of 
atypical assaults across the four criminal types (12 > .20), nor were any significant 
differences found across the criminal types for atypical burglaries (12 > .02). 
Simple effects analyses also showed no differences in rated aggressiveness between 
typical and atypical assaults across the four criminal types (all 12-values > .01). Finally, 
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analyses also showed that typical burglaries were rated as significantly more aggressive 
than atypical burglaries when committed by "typical assaulters," (l (38) = 4.08, 12 < .001). 
No other differences in aggressiveness ratings were found across the other criminal profile 
types, (12 > .05, for all differences). In sum, assaults tended to be rated as more aggressive 
than burglaries, except in the case where the "typical assaulter" committed the typical 
burglary. There, ratings for aggressiveness were substantially higher. 
Criminal Evaluations 
After answering these questions about the behavior under consideration, subjects 
turned their attention to the person. Similar analyses were performed on these questions as 
were performed on the preceding questions. First, subjects were asked to consider the 
likelihood that a person like the one described would commit the crime being considered, 
the means for which are shown in Table 20k. Analyses on this question revealed a main 
effect for the person descriptions, F(3,302) = 29.73, 12 < .001. Post-hoc tests showed 
that the "positive person" description led to decreased likelihood that this type of person 
would commit the crime under consideration (whether it be assault or burglary). The 
ratings for the other three types of descriptions did not differ. These analyses also revealed 
a main effect of typicality, F(l,302) = 5.34, 12 < .025. Here, atypical crimes (M = 3.09) 
tended to heighten the likelihood that the criminal, regardless of the description, would 
commit this type of crime (M = 3.42). 
Subjects also made ratings of criminal typicality, the means for which can be found 
in Table 201. Analyses on these ratings revealed a significant main effect for the person 
descriptions, F(3, 302) = 37.07, 12 < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the "positive 
person" description was rated as much less typical than the other three descriptions, which 
did not differ. The analyses also revealed a main effect for the crime type, F( 1,302) = 
18.44, 12 < .001. Here, the person committing an assault (M = 3.23) was rated as more 
typical than the person committing a burglary (M = 3.86). 
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Subjects were also asked to indicate their degree of certainty that this person would 
commit the crime under consideration again. The mean responses for this question can be 
found in Table 20m. Analyses on this question revealed a main effect for person 
descriptions, F(3,302) = 14.89, I2 < .001. Post-hoc tests showed that the subjects' 
certainty of recidivism was significantly lessened when they read about the "positive 
person." The ratings for the other three criminal profile types did not differ. The analysis 
of variance also revealed a main effect for the crime category, F(l,302) = 20.70, .Q < .001. 
Here, subjects were more certain that a person who committed an assault would commit the 
crime again on another occasion (M = 2.68), than they were a person who committed a 
burglary (M = 3.26). 
Next, subjects were asked to evaluate the person they had read about on a number 
of dimensions. These ratings took the form of seven-point bipolar scales and were 
analyzed using a similar analysis of variance as the other questions. The first question, the 
means for which are shown in Table 20n, asked subjects to rate how angry they perceived 
the subject to be. Analyses on this question revealed a main effect for the person 
descriptions, F(3,302) = 33.50, .Q < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the "typical 
assaulter" (described as an angry person) was rated as more angry than the other person 
types. The "positive person" descriptions was rated as significantly less angry than any of 
the other criminal profile types. Ratings of perceived anger did not differ between the 
"typical burglar" and the "negative person." Analyses also revealed a main effect for the 
crime types, F(l,302) = 155.04, .Q < .001. Persons who committed assaults (M = 6.04) 
were rated as much angrier as persons who commit burglaries (M = 4.37). 
Analyses also revealed a nearly significant crime type by typicality interaction, 
F(l ,302) = 12.28, .Q < .005. Simple effects analysis revealed that criminals who commit 
atypical assaults were rated as angrier than criminals who commit typical assaults (1 (157) = 
3.57, .Q < .001), while no differences were found between typical and atypical burglaries 
(.Q > .20). Furthermore, persons who commit assaults were rated as angrier than those 
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who commit burglaries, whether the crimes be typical assaults versus typical burglaries 
(1 (157) = 5.05, J2 < .001), or atypical assaults versus atypical burglaries (1 (157) = 10.85, 
]2 < .001). 
The second scale asked subjects to rate how evil they perceived this person to be, 
the means for which are shown in Table 200. Analyses on this question revealed a 
significant main effect for the person descriptions, F(3,302) = 14.36, J2 < .001. Post-hoc 
tests revealed that the "typical assaulter" was rated as significantly more evil than the 
"typical burglar" and the "positive person" but did not differ from the "negative person." 
Analyses also revealed a significant main effect for crime type, F( 1,302) = 17.46, 
J2 < .001. Those who commit assaults (M = 5.03) are rated as more evil than those who 
commit burglaries (M = 4.53). 
The third scale asked subjects to rate how desperate they perceived the criminal to 
be. Analyses on these ratings (the means for which can be found in Table 20p) revealed a 
significant main effect for the person descriptions, F(3,298) = 10.66, .12 < .001. Post-hoc 
tests revealed that the "typical assaulter" and "positive person" were rated equally desperate 
and both were significantly less desperate than the "typical burglar" and the "negative 
person," who did not differ from each other on ratings of perceived desperation. The 
analyses also revealed a main effect for crime type, F(l ,298) = 16.17, .12 < .001. Here, a 
person who committed an assault (M = 5.39) was rated as more desperate than a person 
who commits a burglary (M = 4.69). 
The fourth scale asked subjects to rate the intelligence of the person described, the 
means for which can be found in Table 20q,. Here, the analyses revealed a significant 
main effect for the person descriptions, F(3, 298) = 16.74, J2 < .001. Post-hoc tests 
revealed that the "typical burglar" was rated as significantly less intelligent than the other 
criminal types. The "positive person" was rated as more intelligent than the other criminal 
types. Ratings of intelligence for the "typical assaulter" and the "negative person" did not 
differ from each other. The analyses also revealed a significant main effect for typicality, 
F(l,298) = 21.59, 12 < .001. Here, those who commit atypical crimes (M = 4.74) were 
rated as less intelligent than those who commit typical crimes (M = 4.04). 
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No significant differences were found for ratings of deceptiveness, the fifth scale. 
The mean values for this scale can be found in Table 20r. The sixth scale asked subjects to 
rate the aggressiveness of the person, the means for which can be found in Table 20s. 
Analyses on these ratings revealed a main effect for the person descriptions, F(3,298) = 
19.23, 12 < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that, while the "negative person" and "typical 
assaulter" did not differ from each other, both persons were rated as signficantly more 
aggressive than the "typical burglar" who in tum was rated as more aggressive than the 
"positive person." Analyses also revealed a significant main effect for crime types, 
F(l ,298) = 120.14, 12 < .001. Here, the person who committed an assault was rated as 
more aggressive (M = 6.04) than the person who commited a burglary (M = 4.22). 
Analyses on these questions also revealed a nearly significant person description by 
crime type interaction, F(l,298) = 9.39, 12 < .01. Simple effects analyses revealed that 
person committing assaults were consistently rated as more aggressive than persons who 
committed burglaries, across all four criminal types (all differences, 12 < .005). Within the 
crime categories, though, different patterns of means were found. For assaults, analyses 
revealed significant differences in ratigs of criminal aggressiveness across the four criminal 
types, F(3, 155) = 19.28, 12 < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the "typical assaulter" was 
rated as significantly more aggressive than the other three criminal types. The "positive 
person" was rated as significantly less aggressive than the aother three criminal types. 
Ratings of aggressiveness for the "typical burglar" and the "negative person" did not differ. 
For burglaries, analyses did not reveal significant differences in ratings of aggressiveness 
for the four criminal types (12 > .01). 
Next, subjects were asked to rate the degree to which they perceived the person to 
be a threat to himself, the means for which can be found in Table 20t. Analyses on these 
ratings revealed a significant main effect for the person description, F(3,298) = 9.60, 
109 
ll < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the "positive person" description was seen as less of 
a threat to himself than the other three descriptions, which did not differ from each other. 
Analyses also revealed a significant main effect for crime type, F(l,298) = 14.80, 
ll < .001. Here, a person who commits an assault (M = 2.97) is seen as more of a threat 
to self than one who commits a burglary(M = 3.64). Analyses also revealed a trend for 
typicality, F(l,298) = 7.39, ll < .01. There was a tendency for those who commit atypical 
crimes (M = 3.07) to be perceived as greater threats to self than those who commit typical 
crimes (M = 3.54). 
Subjects were also asked to rate the perceived threat to society of the criminal, the 
means for which can be found in Table 20u. Analyses on this questions revealed main 
effects for all factors. First, a main effect for the person descriptions was observed, 
F(3,303) = 11.81, ll < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the "positive person" was 
described as less of a threat to society than the other criminal types, which did not differ 
from each other. Analyses also revealed a main effect for the crime type, F(l,303) = 
33.27, Q < .001. Here, those who committed assaults (M = 2.03) were rated as greater 
threats to society than those who committed burglaries (M = 2.82). 
Next, subjects assessed the degree to which they could attribute the criminal's 
behavior to dispositional factors, the means for which are reported in Table 20v. Analyses 
on these ratings revealed a main effect for the person descriptions, F(3,303) = 24.89, ll < 
.001. Post-hoc tests revealed that dispositional attributions were weakest for the "positive 
person" descriptions, while the other three descriptions did not differ from each other. 
The analyses also revealed a nearly significant three-way interaction, F(3,303) = 
3.91, p < .01. This interaction is displayed in Figure 2, which shows differences in 
dispositional attributions made between typical assaults and typical burglaries across the 
four criminal types. Simple effects analyses revealed no differences in dispositional 
attributions made between typical assaults and typical burglaries for each of the four 
criminal profile types. An oneway analysis of variance performed to investigate differences 
Figure 2: Dispositional Attribution Ratings as a Function of Crime, Typicality, and 
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in dispositional attributions made across the four criminal types for typical assaults revealed 
a trend for criminal type, F(3,76) = 4.10, n < .01. Post-hoc tests revealed that 
dispositional attributions were weakest for the "positive person" description. A similar 
analysis performed on the typical burglaries also revealed a significant effect for the crminal 
types, F(3,76) = 7.39, n < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed a similar pattern as found for 
typical assaults: dispositional attributions made for the "positive person" description were 
weaker than the other three criminal types, which did not differ from each other. Analyses 
also showed that the only difference between crime types in dispositional attributions made 
was for the "typical assaulter.". Here, dispositional attributions were stronger for atypical 
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assaults than atpyical burglaries, 1 (38) = 3.92, 12 < .001. No other differences were found 
at each of the criminal types. Analyses across the four criminal types for the atypical 
crimes revealed a similar pattern of effects as those performed for typical crimes. For 
atypical assaults, a significant effect was found across the criminal types, F(3,76) = 12.28, 
12 < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that dispositional attributions for the "positive person" 
were weaker than for the other three crminal types, which did not differ from each other. 
For atypical burglaries, there was also an effect for the criminal types, F(3,76) = 6.29, 
12 < .001. Post-hoc tests revealed that the only significant diffemce was between ratings 
made for the "positive person" and those made for the "typical burglar." 
Simple effects analyses also revealed that the only difference between typical and 
atypical assaults occurred for the "typical assaulter" where dispositional attibutions were 
stronger for the atypical assault than for the typical assault, 1 (38) = 4.30, 12 < .001. No 
other differences were found at each of the criminal types (all }2'..s. > .15). Finally, analyses 
at each criminal type revealed no differences in dipositional attributions made between 
typical and atypical burglaries. 
Subjects were also asked to make responsibility ratings. Here, analyses on these 
ratings only revealed a trend for the crime type, F(l,303) = 10.39, 12 < .005. Here, 
assaults (M = 1.42) tended to producegreater responsibility ratings than burglaries (M = 
1.84). The mean ratings for this questions can be found in Table 20w. Subjects were also 
asked to make situational attribution ratings. Analyses on these ratings revealed no 
significant main effects or interactions. The mean scores for this question can be found in 
Table 20x. 
CHAPTERS 
DISCUSSION 
Pennington and Hastie's (1981, 1986, 1988, 1992) Story Model suggests that 
jurors reconstruct the sequence of events surrounding a crime by using the evidence 
presented at trial to generate a story which they then compare to the requirements for guilt 
provided them through judicial instruction. The verdict category which best matches the 
story will be the verdict chosen. By the time jurors reach a verdict, it is surmised that they 
are comparing stories which are potentially biased by the activation of criminal stereotypes 
affecting the organization, interpretation, and evaluation of the evidence (Bodenhausen, 
1988; Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987) to potentially erroneous verdict categories. 
These erroneous verdict categories result from an inadequate understanding of judicial 
instruction and subsequent overreliance on preconceived notions about the definitions of 
crimes (Smith, 1991a). Thus the verdict decisions which could be reached are potentially 
biased. The purpose of this project was to investigate the biases which go into the decisions 
which jurors make. 
When reaching verdict decisions, jurors compare their version of the evidence with 
their understanding of the law. Although the law assumes that jurors enter the criminal 
justice system as blank slates, naive as to the legal requirements of guilt, Study 1 
demonstrated that people do possess naive representations of different crimes, replicating 
the findings of Smith (1991a). Subjects were able to list features which they associated 
with various crimes. Study 2 showed that the more characteristic features a crime scenario 
contained, the more typical an instance of the crime the scenario was judged to be. These 
findings are similar to those of Rosch and Mervis ( 1975) who defined typicality in terms of 
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the number of features an instance of a category possessed. Applying this logic to 
representations of crimes, the typicality of an instance of a crime was determined, in part, 
by the number of characteristic features the crime scenario contained. The findings of 
Study 2, again, replicate the findings of Smith (1991 a). 
The effects of typicality on verdict decisions were assessed in Study 3. Using 
typical and atypical instances of the crimes of assaults and burglaries (as determined in 
Study 2), subjects were asked to make verdict decisions. As expected, conviction rates 
were higher for typical burglaries as compared to atypical burglaries. However, a similar 
effect was not found for the assault scenarios. As a manipulation check, subjects were also 
asked to rate the typicality of crimes committed. Although the scenarios were selected 
based, primarily, on typicality ratings made in Study 2, these differences in rated typicality 
were not found between the assault scenarios in Study 3. In comparison, large differences 
in rated typicality were observed between the two burglary scenarios, with typical 
burglaries being rated by subjects as more typical of the crime of burglary than atypical 
burglaries. 
Analyses on the verdict decisions suggested that when subjects perceived typicality 
differences between the instances of the crime, there was a difference in the conviction 
rates. Within the context of these stimuli, highly typical instances of crimes led to a higher 
proportion of guilty verdicts. This was particularly marked for the burglary scenarios 
where large differences in rated typicality between the typical and atypical scenarios was 
associated with large differences in the conviction rates between the two scenario types. 
Although subjects failed to see the expected differences in typicality of the assault 
scenarios, this failure was reflected in the lack of difference in conviction rates for the two 
assault scenarios. Thus, the findings of this study partially replicate those of Smith 
(1991 a). Perceived typicality affects verdict decisions made, with high ratings of typicality 
being associated with a greater likelihood of a guilty verdict. 
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Crime type and typicality also affected the sentence decisions made. On average, 
assaults led to longer sentences than burglaries, with typical assaults producing the harshest 
sentences. Assaults were seen as more severe, heinous, harsh, and aggressive than 
burglaries. The persons who committed assaults were seen as greater threats to self and 
society, and received higher ratings of responsibility. All of this suggests that sentence 
decisions are primarily a function of perceived severity of the behavior, with crimes against 
persons perceived as more severe than crimes against property. 
Another aspect of the Story Model involves the story construction stage where 
jurors determine the facts of the case through evaluation of the evidence. Bodenhausen and 
Lichtenstein (1987) suggest that when faced with complex tasks such as the integration of 
evidence into a verdict decision, jurors are likely to rely upon criminal stereotypes to help 
make sense out of the evidence. Crime information which is consistent with the stereotype 
is more readily remembered and thus affects the decisions jurors make. In particular, they 
suggested that criminal stereotypes affect sentence decisions. Bodenhausen and 
Lichtenstein suggested further that criminal stereotypes serve as a central theme around 
which jurors evaluate the evidence presented at trial. This would suggest that criminal 
stereotypes could affect the story construction stage and thus the verdict decision reached. 
In order to assess the effects of stereotypes on juridical decisions, it was first 
necessary to define those traits which were associated with different types of criminals. 
Using the same thought-listing procedure employed by Smith (199la), subjects were asked 
to list characteristic traits or features they associated with various criminal types. The 
results of this study suggest that people do possess representations of different criminal 
types, just as they do crime types. Furthermore, these representations suggest two classes 
of criminal. The person who would commit a crime against person (assault, manslaughter, 
murder) was described as having a particular set of traits, such as aggressiveness, anger, 
and malevolence. The person who would commit a property crime (burglary) was not seen 
as possessing these traits. Rather, such a criminal possessed traits like low intelligence, 
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desperation, and deceptiveness. It appears that the qualities seen as typical of a criminal 
type are those qualities which would facilitate his/her crime. For a person to commit an 
assault, he/she would need to possess a certain degree of aggressiveness and malevolence. 
Traits such as desperation or deceptiveness would not facilitate such an aggressive 
behavior. However, these traits would facilitate the crime of burglary. From profiles 
generated through various combinations of personality, emotional, and behavioral traits, 
four criminal profiles were selected: a typical assaulter, a typical burglar, a person 
possessing negative traits who was judged to be no more likely to commit assault than 
burglary, and a person possessing positive traits who was judged to be unlikely to commit 
either of the crimes. 
Study 3 found no evidence for an effect of criminal information on verdict 
decisions. However, this is not to say that subjects disregarded the criminal information 
entirely. The typical assaulter was seen as angrier, more aggressive, and more malevolent 
than any of the other criminal types, suggesting that subjects did remember those pieces of 
information about that particular criminal type. The typical burglar was seen as more 
desperate and less intelligent than the other criminal types; again suggesting that attention 
was paid to those pieces of information. Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that 
subjects were evaluating the criminals in part based on the behavior that this person 
engaged in. For instance, when asked to rate the degree of perceived anger, subjects' 
ratings differed depending upon whether they considered the crime of assault or burglary. 
For assault, where the actor was portrayed as expressing anger, the positive person was 
seen as less angry than the other three profiles, which did not differ from each other. 
However, when the crime of burglary was under consideration, and anger was not a part of 
the criminal behavior, subjects used the person information to make these ratings, with the 
typical assaulter being judged as angrier than the other three. A similar effect was found 
when participants were asked to describe the aggressiveness of the criminal (the person, 
not the behavior). For assault, where aggressiveness on the part of the actor was one 
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aspect of the behavior, that information was used in judgments about the criminal. Across 
all four criminal types, persons who committed assaults were judged as more aggressive 
than those who committed burglaries. However, the negative person was seen as equally 
aggressive as the typical assaulter when an assault was being considered. When a burglary 
was being considered, the typical assaulter was judged to be the most aggressive. 
Further evidence that subjects were using the criminal information to make sense of 
the criminal behavior came from an investigation of the three-way interactions found. 
When asked to make judgments about the aggressiveness of the criminal behavior, there 
was a tendency for subjects to increase ratings of perceived aggressiveness for typical 
burglaries when these crimes were committed by the typical assaulter. In fact, the ratings 
of aggressiveness for this instance were no different than ratings of aggressiveness for a 
typical assaulter committing a typical assault (a violent sexual attack). Subjects appeared to 
be perceiving the behavior as more aggressive primarily because it was committed by 
someone with a propensity to behave aggressively. Furthermore, dispositional attributions 
for the criminal behavior were strongest when the subjects were considering an atypical 
assault committed by the typical assaulter. It appears that the atypical assault made more 
sense to the subject when the behavior could be attributed to the aggressive nature of the 
criminal. 
The findings here suggest that people may not possess well-defined stereotypes of 
specific criminal types, since the ratings of typicality and recidivism across the three 
negative profile types on Study 3, after significant differences were found between these 
profiles in Study 2. It appears that people possess an understanding of the crime and when 
asked to describe a person who would commit that crime, they can list traits which seem to 
facilitate the commission of that crime. It was assumed that the collection of traits listed 
comprised the stereotype of the criminal. These collections of traits were found to be 
associated with certain types of crimes/criminals when the crimes were considered in the 
abstract, as in Study 2 where subjects read a criminal profile and were asked to judge the 
likelihood that this person would commit assault or burglary without providing specific 
information about his behaviors. When specific information about the crime was 
provided, as in Study 3, verdict decisions were based upon the behavior, and the 
characteristics of the criminal did not affect verdict decisions. 
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Although ratings of typicality did not differ across the three negative profile types, 
the three did differ from the positive person in ratings of typicality and recidivism. It seems 
that subjects were using the trait information presented to form evaluative impressions of 
the criminal as a person (Anderson, 1962, 1965; Asch, 1946). The criminal was 
seemingly judged by subjects on a positive-negative dimension with the persons described 
as possessing negative traits (referred to previously as the "typical assaulter," the "typical 
burglar," and the "negative person") being evaluated more negatively than the "positive 
person." The negative persons were rated as more typical of either of the criminal types, 
seen as greater threats to self and society, and were rated as more likely to commit the crime 
again, regardless of the type of crime being considered. However, these impressions did 
not have an impact on verdict decisions. 
One possible explanation for why subjects apparently disregarded the criminal 
information may center on motivational factors. Fiske and Neuberg's (1990) continuum 
approach to impression formation suggests that when people first encounter trait 
information about a person, they categorize this person at a very superficial level (for 
instance, along racial or gender lines). This approach, as well as Brewer's (1988) Dual 
Processing Model, further suggests that people will only process trait information further if 
they have a motivation to do so. Since subjects' verdict decisions appear to be behaviorally 
driven, they were not motivation to process the trait information beyond a superficial, 
evaluative (positive/negative) level. However, when required to answer specific questions 
about the personality of the criminal, subjects' responses indicated that they had paid 
attention to the information. Perhaps having subjects answer specific questions about the 
criminal prior to making verdict and sentence decisions would result in their incorporating 
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this trait infomration into their considerations of verdicts and sentences. However, when 
not motivated to do so, subjects' evaluative impressions of the criminal had little bearing on 
the verdict decisions made. 
Similarly, these evaluative impressions did not affect sentence decisions. 
Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein ( 1987) found evidence to suggest that stereotypes have an 
effect upon the sentence decisions made. This study failed to replicate that effect. The 
criminal information presented here had no effect upon sentence length. However, the 
stereotype information Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein used centered on racial stereotypes, 
considered well-defined person categories. The findings in this study suggest that 
stereotypes about particular criminal types may not be as well-defined and thus could not be 
expected to produce the same effects observed in the Bodenhausen and Lichtenstein ( 1987) 
studies. 
In summary, it appears that verdict decisions are driven primarily by the typicality 
of the crime, or by how closely the criminal activity under consideration matches the juror's 
mental representation of the legal requirements of guilt. Sentence decisions seem to be 
determined by the severity of the criminal behavior. Although there is some evidence to 
suggest that criminal behavior is differentially impacted by information about the actor, it 
seems that this impact is not manifested in verdict or sentence decisions. 
Conclusions 
According to the Story Model (Pennington & Hastie, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1992), 
verdict decisions are reached through a comparison of stories to verdict categories. The 
results of the present study support the contentions made by Smith (1991, 1993) that the 
verdict categories used by subjects differ substantially from those specified by law. A lack 
of understanding of judicial instruction coupled with an overreliance on preconceived 
beliefs about the definitions of crimes seem likely causes of this difference. The verdicts 
which are then reached can be biased by these flawed categories. 
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It appears that the verdict decisions were reached solely on the basis of the behavior 
described and that criminal stereotype information truly has little, if any, effect on verdict 
decisions. This would in fact be most desirable since judgments of guilt or innocence 
should be made on the basis of an evaluation of the behavior and not on any biases against 
the perpetrator of the behavior. However, the contention made by Bodenhausen & 
Lichtenstein ( 1987) that stereotypes serve as a central theme around which people organize 
and evaluate evidence presented at trial is compelling, and with the limitations of the present 
study, no firm conclusions about the effects of stereotypes in general on evidence 
evaluation, and subsequently verdicts, can be made. 
APPENDIX A 
120 
121 
CRIME SCENARIOS USED IN STUDY 2 
Assault Scenarios 
Case A 
John and his girlfriend were at a bar one night. He excused himself to go to the 
bathroom, and when he returned, he noticed that his girlfriend had been approached by 
another man. John became jealous, but did nothing about it then. Later he saw this person 
leaving the bar alone, excused himself again, and followed the other man out the door. He 
followed the man into an alley, pulled a gun from his pocket, approached the other man 
from behind, and pushed his face up against a brick wall. Placing the gun against the 
man's back, John said, "Don't you ever come near her again or I will make you regret it." 
Afraid that John would kill him and feeling the bruises forming on his face, the man simply 
nodded quickly. John pushed him to the ground, kicking him as he walked past. 
CaseB 
Bob was waiting behind a bush for a female jogger running alone through the park 
one night. When the victim approached, Bob grabbed her from off the path and pushed her 
down behind the bushes. He put a knife to her throat and said: "Don't scream and I won't 
hurt you." He then proceeded to unzip her sweat jacket and traced her breast with his 
knife. The victim screamed and he slapped her across the face, causing blood to run from 
her nose. The victim struggled and was able to escape, screaming. Police were close by, 
and Bob was arrested. 
CaseC 
Frank's landlord, noticing the lateness (or lack thereof) of rent payments over the 
course of several months, decided to set the eviction process into motion. He went to 
Frank's apartment and notified him that he would be evicted. Frank got angry, reached for 
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a gun, and waived it in front of the landlord's face saying: "You're not gonna evict me. 
That would make me angry, and when I get angry, I hurt people. Understand?" Afraid 
that Frank would seriously injure him, the landlord decided to allow the authorities to evict 
the Frank. 
CaseD 
Tom sold drugs for a local drug lord. His boss told him to go scare somebody who 
owed them money. Tom saw the guy on a street comer and approached him, telling him 
who had sent him and to tum over the money. The guy tried to run away. Tom pulled a 
gun out of his pocket and fired a shot into the air. This caused the guy to stop running. 
Tom pointed the gun at the man and said: "Give me the money, now!" He gave Tom the 
money and Tom left. 
CaseE 
Mike's girlfriend broke up with him after a major argument over his infidelities. 
She returned to his apartment one day to get her things. Mike was there, and she noticed 
that he had been drinking. He begged her to come back, but she refused. They started 
arguing again and both got very angry. He tried to block her exiting the apartment, but she 
pushed past him. He grabbed her by the arm and raised his hand as if to strike her. Her 
eyes opened wide with fear because she knew that he was prone to violence when he 
drank. When Mike saw the look of fear in her eyes, he broke down and cried. She left. 
CaseF 
Paul approached a woman on the street one day and struck up a conversation with 
her. They had a friendly conversation for a few minutes. At the end of the conversation, 
he propositioned her, and this made her angry. He grabbed her around the waist and 
pulled her close, as she struggled to escape. He kissed her forcibly on the lips. She tried 
123 
to hit him, but he ducked and slapped her across the side of the head saying: "You bitch! 
So you like to play rough." She hit him with her purse and escaped. She called the police 
and Paul was picked up. 
CaseG 
Sam was driving when he was cut off by another driver. This made him angry, so 
he started following the other guy. When that guy parked his car, he pulled up next to him 
and got out of his car. He ran up to the guy and said, "Hey what do you think you were 
doing? Cut me off again like that and I'll knock you into next week!" The other driver was 
much smaller than Sam and was afraid for his life, so he just nodded. 
CaseH 
A man was walking home from work one night when he was grabbed from behind 
and pulled into an alley. Pete flashed a knife in his face and asked for all his money: "Just 
reach into your pocket nice and slow and give me your wallet and I won't kill you." The 
man said that he did not have any money and showed him his empty wallet as proof. 
Frustrated, Pete punched the victim in the stomach, causing him to double over in pain. 
Pete then ran away. 
The laws of a local town require that all convicted sexual offenders must register 
with the local authorities before settling there. Eric heard that such a person had moved 
into his apartment building. Not wanting this kind of person living in his neighborhood, 
Eric decided to scare him into moving away. One night, he broke into this person's 
apartment and noticed someone lying on the couch. Assuming that this was the person, he 
began to beat this man with his fists saying that he didn't want his kind around here. Eric 
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then quickly left the apartment. He later learned that the person on the couch was not the 
offender, but someone else. 
Burglary Scenarios 
Case A 
The house John had been watching for over a week was in an affluent suburb. 
Through his observations, John had started to learn the family's behavior patterns. One 
night, while the family was away, the defendant disconnected the alarm system and gained 
access to the house by breaking a window in the back. He immediately went upstairs to the 
master bedroom and removed all of the lady's gold and jewelry, putting it into a sack. He 
then went downstairs, disconnected the stereo, VCR, and TV and put everything into his 
van he had parked in the back. John then made his escape. 
CaseB 
Dressed in black, Bob snuck into the building which contained the law offices. He 
quietly ascended the back staircase, avoiding all security cameras. He picked the lock on 
the door leading to the attorney's office and entered. Leaving the lights off, he immediately 
went to the file cabinets, opened them, and began rifling through the files. When he found 
the file containing the evidence against him, he removed it and placed it in his jacket. He 
closed the file drawer, making certain everything was left the way it had been when he 
arrived, and left the office and the building. 
CaseC 
Mike was walking down the street one day wondering when he witnessed a woman 
running out of her house, as if in a hurry. He further noticed that she had left the door to 
the house open. He thought that he could sneak in, take some money or jewelry, and leave 
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and nobody would know. He went up to the front door and listened for noises corning 
from the house. When he heard none, he assumed nobody was home and pushed open the 
door. He entered the house and looked around. He saw someone, presumably that 
woman's husband, asleep on the couch. Afraid that he would be caught, Mike quietly left 
the house and ran away. 
CaseD 
The laws of a local town require that all convicted sexual offenders must register 
with the local authorities before settling there. Eric heard that such a person had moved 
into his apartment building. Not wanting this kind of person living in his neighborhood, 
Eric decided to scare him into moving away. One night, he broke into this person's 
apartment and noticed someone lying on the couch. Assuming that this was the person, he 
began to beat this man with his fists saying that he didn't want his kind around here. Eric 
then quickly left the apartment. He later learned that the person on the couch was not the 
offender, but someone else. 
CaseE 
Fred was fired from his job loading boxes onto trucks at a local warehouse. No 
reason was given for his dismissal and this made him angry. So that evening, he entered 
the warehouse through a back window that he knew had a broken latch. He then 
proceeded to rip open boxes and scatter the contents all around the warehouse. He also 
spray painted profanities and derogatory remarks about his boss all over the walls. He then 
left the warehouse feeling very satisfied with himself. 
Case F 
An advertising company wanted to get the upperhand on its competitors, so they 
hired Mark to plant listening devices in the boardroom of their main competitor. The 
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advertising company paid a security guard at this other company to leave open a back door. 
Mark entered the building through this door and went up to the boardroom. As he was 
planting the listening devices, another security guard discovered and apprehended him. 
CaseG 
Sam's girlfriend had ended their relationship and had started seeing another guy. 
Sam later learned that they had moved in together and found out where they were living. 
He watched the building until he saw his girlfriend leave. He then entered the building, 
went up to the apartment, and waited in the hall for the other guy. When this man came 
out, Sam brandished a knife and threatened him saying that he would kill him if the 
relationship didn't end. Sam then left the building and the other guy called the police. 
EXAMPLE OF CRIME QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN STUDY 2 
SCENARIO B 
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Bob was waiting behind a bush for a female jogger running alone through the park 
one night. When the victim approached, Bob grabbed her from off the path and pushed her 
down behind the bushes. He put a knife to her throat and said: "Don't scream and I won't 
hurt you." He then proceeded to unzip her sweat jacket and traced her breast with his 
knife. The victim screamed and he slapped her across the face, causing blood to run from 
her nose. The victim struggled and was able to escape, screaming. Police were close by, 
and Bob was arrested. 
1. To what degree are you certain that the crime of assault was committed? 
Absolutely Certain 
assault was 
committed 
1 2 
Uncertain 
3 4 5 
Absolutely Certain 
assault was not 
committed 
6 7 
2. To what degree is the situation described in the above scenario typical of what 
you consider the average assault ? 
Highly Typical Uncertain Highly Atypical 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. What is the likelihood that Bob would be found guilty of assault? 
Extremely Likely Uncertain Extremely Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. To what degree do you perceive Bob's behavior to be harsh? 
Extremely Harsh Uncertain Not at all Harsh 
2 3 4 5 6 7 
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CRIMINAL PROFILES USED IN STUDY 2 
Profile A 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made 
by acquaintances of the person described. One person stated that John didn't know what 
else to do. "Everything else he tried seemed not to help," she claims; "He was at his wits 
end." A second witness, also perceiving this desperation, noted how one of the things 
John tried was to cheat his friends. "John always was trying to trick people into believing 
him," this person claimed. "And he was good at it, too. I fell for it once." Finally, a 
former teacher of his remarked about his academic performance, "John always seemed to 
be one step behind the rest of the class. He couldn't keep up. I recommended that he 
repeat his sophomore year of high school, but he just decided to drop out." 
Profile B 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made 
by acquaintances of the person described. One person noted how Frank had always felt 
deprived. "Frank didn't have much and always wanted more. I wouldn't say he was 
greedy; just that, he felt deprived when he saw what other people had and thought, 'Why 
can't I have those things?"' And it appeared that Frank would do whatever it took to get 
those things. Another person noted, "He lied; he cheated. Frank was always devising 
these schemes, like confidence games." However, these schemes always backfired. A 
third person noted, "Frank wasn't too smart. He couldn't think through all of the details. 
Maybe if he had spent more time in school studying, things might have been different." 
Profile C 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made 
by acquaintances of the person described. "Sam always had a short temper," one person 
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said. "He often got angry with very little provocation." Another person noted that Sam 
was prone to violence. "Sam had always been an aggressive person. He was the class 
bully in grade school. Later, it seemed to be that he was always at the center of some 
fight." Finally a third person described Sam as simply mean. "I didn't like him," this 
person said. "Sam always had this sinister looking sneer on his face. He seems to get off 
on making people uncomfortable. He seems to enjoy intimidating people." 
Profile D 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made 
by acquaintances of the person described. "Eric seemed to be a very angry person," one 
person said. "Even the slightest things would set him off. One time I saw him soar into a 
fit of rage because he could not find his keys." A second person noted how Eric liked to 
fight. "At school, in bars. Eric loved a good fight. If anybody got in his way, he was not 
above taking the guy out." Another person said, "Eric's pure evil. He despises everything 
and everyone. I feel sorry for anyone who crossed his path. Sooner or later, that person 
would pay." 
Profile E 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made 
by acquaintances of the person described. One person described Bob as an obsessive man. 
"He would get an idea in his head and cling to it for long periods of time." A woman he 
worked with noted this same thing. "One time we went to lunch together, and all of the 
sudden Bob thought I was his girlfriend. He sent me flowers; he was constantly 
appearing at my front door. I finally told him to leave me alone, and the calls stopped. But 
it was very creepy." Another male acquaintance of this woman noted that Bob seemed to 
have watched him too. "I swear that I've seen him sitting in his car parked outside of my 
building. Then he would follow me around, like he was keeping tabs on me." 
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Profile F 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made 
by acquaintances of the person described. One childhood friend noted that Rich had started 
with nothing: "Rich was a self-made man, " this person said. "His parents were poor and 
he had to work to put himself through school. But he did it." A professor of his stated, 
"Richard was a tremendously hard worker. He had this drive to succeed at any cost. And 
he did succeed. He graduated in the top 5% of his class." A colleague noted how Rich was 
oftentimes overly analytical: "He dealt with facts, and he needed all of the facts before he 
would make any decisions. This tended to upset some people. But generally the decisions 
that he made always ended up being the right ones." 
Profile G 
The following personality profile was extracted from statements made by 
acquaintances of the person described. One person noted that Paul was raised in a wealthy 
family: "Paul was born with the proverbial silver spoon in his mouth. His father was a 
wealthy businessman and his mother worked for a number of charitable organizations." 
However, this is not to say that Paul had everything handed to him. Another person 
remarked upon his work ethic: "Paul was a hard worker. He believed that you should only 
receive the things that you have earned." Although this may sound strict, a third person 
commented on his personality: "Paul actually was an easy-going guy. I lived next door to 
him for three years and I always remember him as quiet, but polite." 
Profile H 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made 
by acquaintances of the person described. "Bill was a very possessive man," one person 
noted. "He would cling to things that he felt belonged to him." Another person noted his 
dislike for Bill: "Bill had this arrogance about him; this haughtiness which really turned 
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people off." A third person thought he was obnoxious. "Bill constantly put people down, 
especially if they ignored him. Nobody around here really liked him all that much." 
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EXAMPLE OF CRIMINAL QUESTIONNAIRE USED IN STUDY 2 
PROFILE A 
The personality profile information presented was extracted from statements made by 
acquaintances of the person described. One person stated that John didn't know what else 
to do. "Everything else he tried seemed not to help," she claims; "He was at his wits end." 
A second witness, also perceiving this desperation, noted how one of the things John tried 
was to cheat his friends. "John always was trying to trick people into believing him," this 
person claimed. "And he was good at it, too. I fell for it once." Finally, a former teacher 
of his remarked about his academic performance, "John always seemed to be one step 
behind the rest of the class. He couldn't keep up. I recommended that he repeat his 
sophomore year of high school, but he just decided to drop out." 
1. What is the likelihood that John would commit the crime of assault? 
Extremely Likely Uncertain Extremely Unlikely 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. To what degree is John typical of what you consider the average assaulter ? 
Highly Typical Uncertain Highly Atypical 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. To what degree are you certain that John would/would not commit the crime of 
assault? 
Extremely Certain 
John would commit 
assault 
Uncertain Extremely Certain 
John would not 
commit assault 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Please describe John's personality by responding to each of the word pairs listed below. 
angry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 calm 
virtuous 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 evil 
desperate 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 non-desperate 
intelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 unintelligent 
deceptive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 non-deceptive 
aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 non-aggressive 
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